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NOTE

From : Secretariat
To : Delegations
Subject : Lessons from the planning of the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM), Autumn 2001 - December 2002

The attached document, prepared jointly by the Secretariat and the Commission, was noted by the Political and Security Committee on 27 June 2003 following receipt of reports from both the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (doc. 10348/03) and the Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors (doc. 10851/03).
Joint Paper

Lessons from the planning of the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM), Autumn 2001-December 2002

Introduction

The EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) which began operations on 1 January 2003 is the first crisis management operation launched under the EU's European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The planning and setting up of a crisis management operation was an important learning experience for the EU and the first test of its crisis management concepts, procedures and instruments. Although EUPM is a police operation, many of its emerging lessons are relevant for other crisis management operations, civilian or military.
It is important to note, from the outset, two caveats:

1. Planning for the set-up of EUPM took place throughout 2002. This long lead-in time may well be exceptional for crisis management planning and should be kept in mind when drawing conclusions from the EUPM experience. The EU Interim Mission (EUIM) experience of June-July 2002, reviewed by PSC in September 2002, provided a more "real time" planning scenario. ¹

2. EUPM planning lessons are only one part of the EUPM learning experience. The start up and development of the mission represent distinct new stages of the operation. Monitoring and lesson learning should therefore continue throughout the course of EUPM.

This joint paper by the Secretariat and the Commission reflects the perceptions of and experiences obtained by both services during the course of the EUPM planning process. It also incorporates the experiences of the EUPM Planning Team. The goal of the paper is to provide a comprehensive review of the main elements of the EUPM planning process. It is divided into six sections:

I. Planning and Set-up
II. Command and Control
III. Administrative and Financial Set-up
IV. Intra-EU Coordination
V. Coordination with other Actors
VI. Media Strategy

The paper concludes with a summary of main recommendations.

¹ US opposition to the International Criminal Court (ICC) threatened to veto the renewal of the UNMIBH mandate and raised the possibility of EU taking over from IPTF earlier than anticipated, through an EU interim mission intended to temporarily replace IPTF until the start of EUPM on 1 January 2003. On 5 July 2002 UNSC reached agreement to enable UNMIBH's scheduled extension until 31 December 2002. See Secretariat Non-Paper, "Lessons for EU crisis management from EUIM", July 2002.
I. PLANNING AND SET-UP

I.1. Fact-finding missions

An exploratory mission by the Secretariat in November 2001 provided options for the PSC to take a
decision to explore the possibility of an EU police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). ¹
Three short fact-finding missions (FFM) to Sarajevo were undertaken in the pre-planning phase of
EUPM. ² The assessments and recommendations of these FFMs provided the basis for the mandate,
the structure and the budget of EUPM set out in the detailed Council Conclusions of 18 February

The FFMs undertaken for EUPM did not follow closely the "Guidelines on Fact-Finding Missions
in EU Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention" (doc. 15048/01). Guidelines on particular areas
and indicative checklists (recommended in that document) could have been useful for the FFMs. ³

Familiarity with the situation in BiH, the presence and assistance of EUMM HQ, the presence of a
UN police mission, as well as the assessments of BiH police reform and a follow-on mission to UN
IPTF carried out by other organisations (OSCE Monk Report, UNMIBH recommendations) aided
the fact-finding effort.

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¹ Secretariat Non-Paper on IPTF follow-up, 29 November 2001.
² Council Secretariat/Commission High Level Mission, 16-19 December 2001; Technical
Police Fact-finding Mission, 10-16 January 2002 and a Council Secretariat/Commission
³ For example, the establishment of an FFM coordinator or participation of experts from the
Presidency or Member State.
Nonetheless, the short-term nature of FFMs makes it difficult to establish detailed proposals (budget, technical, personnel and equipment needs). Longer, more targeted FFMs may assist in the elaboration of more comprehensive needs assessments. As a follow-on mission, EUPM pre-planning would have benefited from a thorough assessment of UN IPTF status and activities as well as detailed consultations with other international organisations in BiH, especially OHR, in view of the fact that the EUPM mandate was distinct from that of IPTF.

The composition of FFMs is an important component for successful needs assessment. Diverse expertise is required to address all aspects of planning requirements.  

**Recommendations**

- Where an FFM is carried out under a restricted time frame, flexible mechanisms for review of planning estimates (including subsequent issue-specific FFMs) and regular updates of planning figures should be explored.

- One option, time and circumstances permitting, is to establish two Joint Actions. The first would signal EU political intent and provide for a comprehensive Fact-Finding mission (possibly to be funded out of the CFSP budget) which would elaborate detailed planning, financial and administrative estimates. Provisions for the set-up of a Planning Team could also be included in this Joint Action. The formal establishment of the mission would take place through a subsequent Joint Action, which would include the mission statement and detailed personnel and budgetary arrangements.

**I.2. Mission Planning**

No crisis management concept (CMC) was developed for EUPM, given the information on options already available.

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1 An EUMS representative, as well as the Council Legal Service participated in some of the FFMs. External police expertise was also included.
The detailed nature of the Council Conclusions of 18 February and the EUPM Joint Action limited the potential added value of the EUPM CONOPS (doc. 7766/02 RESTRICTED) as a mission planning guide. ¹ The CONOPS value is that it constitutes the EU’s strategic instructions to the Police Head of Mission (PHoM).

The subsequent OPLAN (doc. 10515/02 RESTRICTED) produced by the EUPM Planning Team repeated, in many respects, elements of the CONOPS. ² The OPLAN is the technical and operational detailing of the CONOPS as interpreted by the PHoM. It is a living document and must be adaptable to changing circumstances, often under short time constraints.

The separate presentation of the EUPM OPLAN and its annexes (related implementing arrangements doc. 13063/3/02 REV 3 RESTRICTED) complicated, rather than facilitated, its consideration by Member States.

**Recommendation**

- The OPLAN and its annexes should be examined by PSC/CIVCOM in its totality.

Although sending States’ desire to have detailed information on mission administrative arrangements (especially SOPs) in place well before seconded personnel are deployed is understandable, the elaboration of OPLAN implementing arrangements took up a substantial part of EUPM PT's resources.

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¹ A CMC but no CONOPS was elaborated in the planning of the EU military operation in fYROM (CONCORDIA).

² The EUPM OPLAN was approved by the Council on 12 July 2002. The OPLAN for the fYROM military operation was also approved by the Council (18 March 2003).
**Recommendations**

- Consideration should be given to the establishment of internal standard administrative and financial procedures separate from the OPLAN and available from the outset of a mission. ¹

- In addition to this, generic standard administrative procedures (SAPs) could be elaborated and approved by PSC/CIVCOM. These guidelines would then form the basis for in-field development by EU missions according to specific conditions and operational demands.

Within the context of the Planning Team's work, **strategic programme planning** could have been elaborated at an earlier stage in the planning process. This would have enabled review and possible adjustment as EUPM personnel deployed to the field in preparation for mission start-up. It would have also given incoming personnel greater familiarity with and ownership of the programmes.

### I.3. Legal frameworks

The legitimacy of EUPM is based on the support expressed by the UN Security Council and the explicit invitation by the host State, Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, endorsement by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) demonstrated international political support.

The EU **Joint Action** on EUPM provides the mission with its mandate. The mandate proved sufficiently broad to enable priority-setting (fight against organised crime) for EUPM in November 2002. However, two amendments to the joint action (not related to the mandate) have been required in the first three months of operations: additional financial allocation from CFSP budget and procedures to permit the release of classified information to third parties. ²

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¹ Generic administrative procedures have been used in the planning of UN missions, e.g. UNMIK.

² The amendment on procedures for release of EU classified information is modelled on arrangements set out in the Joint Action for the military operation in FYROM (delegation of authority to SG/HR).
A significant weakness of the EUPM joint action is its lack of guidance on the implementation of Third States' participation in the mission (see below V.3). The elaboration of the authority given to the PHoM to remove non-compliant police officers through a recommendation to the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Joint Action annex, "EUPM Mission Statement") also required considerable effort to translate into workable procedures.

Arrangements negotiated with the BiH authorities were, with the exception of the EUPM SOFA, procedurally "light", notably, the exchange of letters between the BiH State and Entities of 4 March 2002. The EUPM Planning Team deployed to the field under the EUMM SOFA, a flexible solution that met the operational needs of the Planning Team. Elaboration of the draft EUPM SOFA text illustrated the sensitivity of the question of immunities for Member States.

**Recommendations**

- A generic SOFA text could have facilitated the EU's elaboration of a draft EUPM SOFA. ¹

- Although the SOFA contains a general provision mandating the Host State to provide assistance to mission staff for entering/departing the territory, an explicit reference to visa exemptions for EUPM personnel may provide useful clarification.

TEU Article 24 is currently the only base under the treaty for the negotiation of agreements between the EU and third parties. It provides for the Presidency, assisted by the Commission, to undertake negotiations on a text approved by the Council. Article 24 provisions proved a cumbersome tool for negotiating agreements with third parties (BiH SOFA, Third State participation in EUPM). The Council Secretariat was the main point of contact for Third States. ²

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¹ A generic SOFA text for EU police operations, and potentially other civilian crisis operations, remains under discussion in CIVCOM.

² The FYROM joint action provides for the SG/HR to assist the Presidency in negotiation of Article 24 agreements with participating Third States. The SG/HR is the point of contact for relations with the Host State.
– The current Art. 24 framework is lengthy (two Council decisions are required), especially where negotiations are carried out simultaneously with many Parties (18 Third States in the case of EUPM). Moreover multiple negotiations do not encourage a flexible EU approach to meet the constraints of interlocutors (e.g. experiences with Canada, Poland, Russia).

– Art. 24 rigidities required the negotiation of agreements with contributing Third States at an earlier stage in the EUPM planning process. It is a condition to enable transmission of EU classified information.

Recommendations

- A possibility to enable smoother progress for future operations would be to establish a Framework Agreement with Third States for their participation in ESDP operations. Implementing arrangements established on a case by case basis would enable the EU to accommodate, where appropriate, the specific issues not dealt with in the Framework Agreement. A Framework Agreement could also enable the incorporation of third parties in rapidly deployed operations. ¹

To note: The suggestion of a Framework Agreement has been raised by Canada (currently contributing to EUPM on the basis of an interim exchange of letters arrangement). ²

I.4. EUPM Planning Team

The EUPM Planning Team of 28 (23 internationals, 5 local staff) comprised 17 seconded police officers and 6 civilians. Additional civilian experts would have been beneficial in at least two areas:

- procurement and financial management;

¹ The lack of swift procedures for incorporating Third State participation in EU crisis management operations was noted in the Secretariat Non-Paper, "Lessons for EU crisis management from EUIM" of July 2002.

² Comments made during the meeting of the PSC + Third States contributing to EUPM, 25 March 2003.
– programme development (especially in capacity-building areas such as financial management).

Few Member States responded to the Call for Contributions to EUPM PT with seconded civilian personnel. The EUPM planning experience illustrates the need for closer interaction between civilian and police secondment mechanisms for civilian crisis management.

**Recommendations**

- The establishment, from the databases within the Coordinating Mechanism for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management within the Council Secretariat, of a pool of experts with appropriate skills and experience could provide a useful basis for the generation of planning teams.  

- Short-term "loans"/missions from the Commission, the Council Secretariat or relevant international organisations might also be considered.

- Where secondments are not forthcoming, the required expertise should be recruited on contract by the Head of the Planning Team without undue delay, budgetary consequences notwithstanding.

- Training for mission planning could also be considered within the framework of CEPOL, the EC Training Project and national training programmes.

The Planning Team spent four weeks in Brussels during which time they were introduced to the EU and EU crisis management. The Planning Team then deployed to Sarajevo. This enabled it to begin contact with relevant actors on the ground and undertake field assessment but temporarily took focus away from framework planning (e.g. OPLAN, procurement set-up).

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1 The Commission has made this proposal in CIVCOM.
2 European Police Academy (3rd pillar).
3 Training organised by DGE IX with the participation of Secretariat and Commission officials.
**Recommendation**

- Elements of the PT which are not concerned with the logistic set-up of the operation might remain Brussels-based (within the Council Secretariat) during the initial planning phase and/or the Planning Team could deploy to the field in phases.

From October the Planning Team rapidly increased to accommodate the phased deployment of EUPM personnel. The relative informal structure suitable for a small PT was ill-equipped to manage rapid expansion and could have been adapted in advance to ensure smooth work and information flows (e.g. appointing incoming staff to PT, delegation of authority and tasks to appropriate staff/departments).

**Recommendation**

- Induction training should be conceived as much as a means of ensuring the smooth incorporation of personnel into the PT as preparation for participation in the mission.

**I.5. Force generation and deployment**

The Call for Contributions for EUPM was a success both in the number and quality of candidates put forward by Member States and contributing Third States and the relatively smooth way in which the exercise was managed.

- Call for contributions in two phases (Member States/Third States) helped organisational flow for the first Call but may be inefficient and too slow a method for subsequent calls for contributions where the numbers of posts being filled is smaller and the time for rotation shorter.

- Detailed job descriptions was an innovative and transparent way of assisting selection.
– The incorporation of IPTF personnel into the EUPM Planning Team, once UNMIBH downsizing began, was a positive step in assisting the transition and maintaining institutional knowledge.

– Financial/administrative/procurement experts, media experts and crime analysts proved difficult to recruit.

**Recommendations**

- Recruitment is predicated on preselection by participating States. Sending States should a) weed out cases of evident disparity between job descriptions and proposed candidates and b) ensure information provided in individual CVs is correct.

- Applications should be submitted electronically.

- Police, and indeed all, missions require non-police experts (political, legal, media and administrative advisers). Cooperation across civilian crisis management priority areas might facilitate in the identification and provision of appropriate non-police experts.

- Recruitment of international civilians on contract should take place alongside and not subsequent to secondment. For this, adequate budgetary resources are required.

Deployment of personnel to the mission area was complex. In many cases the Police Unit within the Council Secretariat/EUPM PT were not provided with timely and/or exact information on the dates of arrival of incoming personnel, making incorporation and induction difficult. Protracted deployment delays continue to affect the launch of EUPM programmes and activities.

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1 The UN, by contrast, operates a system of tests for personnel seconded to its missions.
The EUPM planning experience demonstrated the need for procedures for the protection of personal data.

Recommendation

- Mission application forms should include the candidate's agreement to the use of his/her personnel data for operational purposes during a specific time period.

II. COMMAND AND CONTROL

II.1. Mission chain of command

The EUPM chain of command (SG/HR-EUSR-PHoM) broadly follows that outlined in the "Guidelines for Command and Control Structure for EU Police Operations in Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management" (doc. 6922/02 RESTRICTED). ¹

The appointment of Lord Ashdown as EUSR and his role in the EUPM chain of command underscored the EU's emphasis on coherence of instruments and EUPM's inclusion within the EU's broad rule of law approach in BiH. The double-hatted EUSR did not play a significant role in EUPM planning, although close contact was maintained between the PT and the OHR.

The visit by the PSC to Sarajevo in September 2002 was a valuable initiative in facilitating PSC's exercise of the political control and strategic direction of the mission by giving it first-hand experience of the mission area and tasks.

¹ These guidelines provide for a greater role for the Police Unit than that set out in the EUPM Joint Action in relation to "providing and coordinating logistic requirements". In the case of EUPM, the Commission, rather than the Police Unit, is a central actor in this area, given its role in implementing the CFSP budget.
The Council Secretariat, exercising the SG/HR’s role in the chain of command on a daily basis, lacked capacity to provide the PT with sufficient back-up and support (small police planning capability, limited financial and personnel resources, limited secure communication channels, lack of specialised expertise).  

In reality, the Planning Team responded to three chains of authority: the mission chain of command noted above, PSC/CIVCOM (review of planning preparations as part of the PSC’s exercise of political control and strategic direction) and Commission (administration and supervision of the CFSP budget). This resulted in multiple communication channels, tasks and travel to Brussels for the PT. On occasion, the PT perceived micro-management by the Secretariat and Member States.

Recommendations

- The mission chain of command might play a greater interface role between Committees/working groups in Brussels and the PT as part of its mission support and back-up.

- A designated point of contact in the Council Secretariat (mission desk officer/cell) is essential, in parallel with the existing project manager in the Commission responsible for the implementation of the CFSP budget.

- The option of temporary reinforcement of the Police Unit should be considered when police missions are undertaken.  

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1 The Crisis Management Procedures (current para 45, doc. 7116/03) note that the "planning capacity of the Council Secretariat could be reinforced by the addition, on an ad hoc basis, of national experts."

2 As noted in the letter of the SG/HR to the Chair of the GAC, Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh, on the establishment of a Police Unit, June 2001.
II.2. Reporting frameworks

The lack of secure communications within the chain of command was problematic and limited, in the first few months of operation, to one email connection and one GSM line.

No formal reporting system from PT to PSC existed during the planning phase. Information was provided through regular briefings by the Secretariat and EUPM PT briefings, an arrangement that appeared to meet PSC information needs in a flexible and swift manner.

II.3. Security Classification

All ESDP operations must follow the Council's security regulations. However, the absence of procedures for the classification and release of information for EUPM documents presented problems for a) determination of classification for PT documents, b) distribution from/to the field and c) distribution to non-EU actors (contributing Third States and international organisations). Procedures initially adopted were cumbersome and incompatible with those of PT’s interlocuteurs, notably NATO/SFOR.

Recommendations

- Information security in the context of a civilian operation must be comprehensively addressed at an earlier stage in the planning process and included in the Joint Action.

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2 The NATO-EU security agreement of March 2003 can be expected to facilitate future exchanges.
Lighter procedures for release of classified information related to a crisis management operation, such as delegation of authority to the SG/HR, should be systematically included in a Joint Action.

III. ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL SET-UP

The new Financial Regulation of the EC, applicable for all operations financed from the CFSP budget, allows for wide-ranging exceptions to normal rules in cases of crisis management operations which are clearly defined. Any operation not fulfilling these criteria must follow normal financial and procurement rules which means that the set-up of an operation like EUPM can take between 6 and 10 months, depending on the circumstances and the assessment of the gravity of the crisis.

III.1. Financial and budgetary arrangements

Contractual relations between the Special Adviser (for EUPM, PHoM) and the Commission are based on a standard contract for EU Special Advisers (e.g. EUMM HoM) designed to comply with the staff regulations as well as EC financial legislation, hence leaving very limited room for negotiation. This should be taken into account for further ESDP operations.

The time span between the Council decision on EUPM and the first payment was less than a month not least due to the successful streamlining and shortening of the decision-making process for financial management.

Budget estimations both for the planning and the 2003 operational phase were heavily reliant on FFM estimations of costs based on the UN/IPTF experience without a very clear idea of the cost implications of the different mandate, size and functioning of EUPM. This made planning very

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difficult and resulted in much adaptation. Lack of qualified staff for EUPM PT in the start-up phase also resulted in planning-related communication gaps between EUPM and its interlocuteurs in Brussels and Member States, especially regarding the 2003 budget.

**Recommendation**

- Mission planning must be as specific as possible and be based on a detailed elaboration of the financial implications of the mandate. It is unavoidable that operational needs change but they need to be monitored closely and flagged early so that planning can be adjusted accordingly.

### III.2. Procurement

Out of the budget of 14 Mio. Euro, 12.6 Mio. Euro were earmarked for procurement of transport, communication and office equipment. The amount of equipment required means that procurement must be a priority from the outset. The crucial need to establish an administrative structure in EUPM PT to perform these procurement procedures was raised as early as January 2002 given the approximately 10 month tendering period required to fully equip the operation.

Two procurement experts (military officers) were seconded to EUPM only in June of whom one took up a different post in November. Before said date, no procurement procedure could be properly prepared and started. The delays in setting up EUPM PT did no longer allow for the application of the standard procurement rules and led the Commission to adopt a decision that simplified procedures as much as possible (tripling of applicable thresholds and reducing time periods for submitting tenders by more than half).  

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1. COM (2002) 2244, 24 June 2002. It should be noted that the new Financial Regulation applicable as of 1.1.2003 no longer allows for a specific modification of procurement rules as was done for EUPM PT, yet it introduced generally more simple and more flexible procedures for crisis management, amongst others negotiated procurement procedures.
However, the reduction of human resources dedicated to procurement from two to one at the end of the year led the remaining team to struggle with nearly a dozen at times very complex tender procedures to be finalised before year-end to ensure operational start-up on 1 January 2003. In addition to this the procurement side suffered from the fact that equipment needs kept changing over the course of the year.  

Despite these circumstances, EUPM Planning Team was successful in completing the most vital tenders in time for the start-up of the operation, albeit with substantial input from Commission services in Brussels. Although this is not a problem in itself, it does entail a risk of blurred responsibilities between the different actors: the contracting authority – here, EUPM – must be in a position to perform these tasks independently from the supervisory authority.

The EUPM experience shows the equal importance of administrative aspects of an operation alongside the more visible operational ones.

**Recommendations**

- The crucial need to establish an administrative structure to perform procurement procedures and the time-line such procedures imply is a key element prior to any launching of an operation.

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1 In the second semester of 2002 the Commission authorised award of contract for EUPM PT following 7 international tenders, 1 local tender, 3 simplified and 2 negotiated procedures. In addition to this, 3 international tenders had to be cancelled and 3 negotiated procedures were refused. This adds up to 19 tender dossiers in 6 months. At least 3 tenders were launched to meet additional needs defined by EUPM PT after an initial tendering procedure was already launched.

2 This included regular advice and support on procedures but also work on tender files itself as well as extended discussions with the Commission’s control bodies to explain and interpret problematic contracts submitted for award.
• Secondment of procurement experts from the very beginning of the planning and procurement phase is key to enabling timely operational set-up.

• Recruitment by contract of expert staff for procurement must be explored in a timely fashion, if it becomes evident that competent staff will not be seconded swiftly.

• Constant coordination between the different sections of the Planning Team dealing with planning and procurement is vital. Planning has to take into account procurement timing and should reach a point where subsequent procurement no longer needs to be substantially modified.

• Any change in mission planning must consider and take into account the effect on procurement procedures and take appropriate measures to adapt the latter accordingly.

IV. INTRA-EU COORDINATION

Flow of information between Secretariat and Commission was sufficient but not exhaustive. The EUPM Task Force in Brussels provided a forum only for basic information exchange on respective separate contacts with the Planning Team.

Recommendation

• Designated contact points, more regular and issue-specific meetings of the Task Force might facilitate better coordination and a more problem-solving approach.

Contacts between EUPM PT and the "EU family" in BiH were very good. The PT received important logistical and other support from EUMM, with half the PT initially based in EUMM HQ.

1 Arrangements for intra-EU coordination in EUPM are set out in Annex III of the Council Conclusions of 18 February 2002.
Recommendation

- Where an EU presence is already on the ground, advance consideration could be given to possible synergies with the incoming mission, especially in terms of logistics/equipment.

Coordination between EUPM PT and the Commission delegation in Sarajevo was initiated through the informal Joint Coordination Group and focused mainly on the CARDS programme. Good cooperation led to innovative steps such as a) co-deployment of CARDS EUPM support project staff in EUPM HQ and b) EUPM/CARDS steps to coordinate multiple bilateral funding projects to BiH police.

Recommendation

- Occasional joint briefings by the representatives of the CARDS programme and EUPM in Brussels and elsewhere might be a useful way of encouraging further consideration of how a comprehensive EU approach could be developed in mission areas.

V. COORDINATION WITH OTHER ACTORS

V.1. Transition from UNMIBH/IPTF to EUPM

As a follow-on mission to IPTF, transition with the UN was crucial. A number of steps to facilitate this were implemented, notably double-hatting of IPTF Commissioner/Head of the PT and colocation of the PT with IPTF. On balance, the transition was successful. Nevertheless, a number of problems were encountered on the ground. A transition task force composed of the EUSR, senior PT, UNMIBH and IPTF officials may have assisted information sharing, joint problem solving and advance planning.
Double-hatting

The double-hatting of the Head of the PT/IPTF Commissioner, agreed with the UN HQ, sent a strong signal of the EU's commitment to seamless transition. It gave PHoM first-hand experience and knowledge of senior BiH police authorities and status of police reform. However, the dual role was onerous and prevented the IPTF Commissioner/Head of EUPM PT from consistent engagement with EUPM PT and its work. EUPM's credibility as a distinct and independent mission, particularly in local perceptions, has been constrained by the fact that the same individual responsible for difficult IPTF decisions (especially decertification) leads the follow-on mission. The symbiotic relationship may also have impeded EUPM PT's ability to adopt different approaches in its planning to that recommended by UNMIBH/IPTF.

Colocation

Although the colocation of EUPM PT in UNMIBH HQ was satisfactory, the gradual increase of PT put strains on the relationship. The lack of formal negotiated arrangements between the UN and the EU on the terms and reference of their relationship meant there was no mechanism to address problems and questions. Advance coordination between UN DPKO/Secretariat and/or Commission may have enabled clearer guidelines for PT colocation as well as maximisation of the possibilities of transition (purchase of some UN equipment etc.)

Information sharing

The presence of PT alongside IPTF HQ was intended to enable maximal information exchange on BiH police reform. At the individual officer level, this generally functioned well. At the mission level, however, there were gaps. PT did not receive full and detailed information on the status of IPTF programmes. Information regarding BiH police (local police registry) as well as some IPTF archives were not handed over until the conclusion of UNMIBH.
Earlier coordination between UN DPKO/Secretariat and/or Commission could have assisted in determining the feasibility of information-sharing according to UN and EU regulations as well as generic procedures for transfer of information. More systematic information-sharing in the mission area could also have helped navigate joint challenges such as how EUPM might address unfinished IPTF tasks (e.g. BiH police certification process).

**Recommendation**

- Transition from UN to EU civilian crisis management operations requires advance strategic coordination between headquarters. Designated frameworks/points of contact would be useful.

- The transition process must be regularly monitored and reviewed at headquarters, as well as field level.

**V.2. Relations with BiH authorities**

Little contact was maintained with BiH authorities beyond that required for the a) initial establishment of an EUPM, b) PT deployment and status and c) negotiation of the EUPM SOFA. Preparatory contact, especially in relation to SOFA negotiation (e.g. BiH areas of concern) may have facilitated the swifter conclusion of this process. The fact that EUPM planning coincided with national elections also served to distract attention.

The PT's deliberate low profile and the overlap with UNMIBH/IPTF constrained planning contacts on the ground in BiH. More contact with BiH authorities, especially police authorities, may have facilitated local knowledge of, and "buy in" to, EUPM as well as the development of joint strategies (although no problems have yet been noted in this regard).
Recommendation

- The Presidency, supported by the SG/HR and/or, where appropriate, the EUSR, should establish contacts with the Host State for coordination of the planning phase.

V.3. Relations with contributing Third States

The decision to invite 20 Third States to contribute to EUPM was an important signal of the inclusiveness of EU-led crisis management. It also enabled the contribution of experienced personnel to EUPM. Third State participation was not, however, needed to fully recruit or fund the mission (Third States contribute 20% of EUPM personnel and their financial contribution to common costs is EUR 25 000 per year).

The way in which Third States were engaged in EUPM, however, was problematic.

- Article 24 framework: relatively lengthy and inflexible procedure (cf. I.3 above).

- The decision to impose a financial contribution from Third States to common running costs was a) late and contentious b) awkward to administer within the framework of the EUPM budget c) insufficient a sum to be of real value to EUPM (in the event, the sum was subtracted from CFSP allocated contribution) and d) created additional administrative burdens for the PT/EUPM and the Secretariat. The negative reaction from Third States undermined the perceived symbolic benefit of such a contribution. ¹

- Earlier negotiation of contribution might enable Third States to receive documents and information (cf. I.3 above).

¹ This aspect was the only criticism raised by Third States in their assessment of the way in which their participation in EUPM was managed (Meeting with the PSC and Third State contributors, 25 March 2003).
Recommendations

- While the decision to invite Third State participation is a political one, advance consideration must be given to its practical implementation.

- The general question of Third State contribution to common operating costs (costs/benefits/modalities) should be comprehensively addressed in coordination with Third States.

V.4. Coordination with SFOR

Coordination with NATO/SFOR was a priority for the EUPM chain of command from the outset (e.g. PHoM visit to NATO HQ in Brussels in April 2002) and for the PT upon deployment to Sarajevo. Coordination in the mission area enabled SFOR emergency and medical back-up support to EUPM PT and EUPM as well as regular information exchange. SFOR-EUPM coordination was one of the most successful aspects of PT planning.

The technical assistance arrangements agreed between EUPM and SFOR are a good example of the flexible and procedurally "light" arrangements that can be established in the field. The EU-NATO security agreement further facilitates information exchange.

V.5. Coordination with other international organisations in BiH

Although relations were positive, some international organisations in BiH complained of insufficient information about EUPM (mandate and structure) during the planning phase. Information materials, earlier deployment of liaison officers and mobile presentations may have facilitated outreach efforts in the field.


**Recommendations**

- More coordination at headquarters level (OSCE, CoE) could take place in advance of and immediately after the deployment of a planning team to increase knowledge of the mission.

- More systematic outreach might be conducted by the PT to ensure field personnel of other international organisations are informed of EUPM's impending mandate, role and programmes.

**VI. MEDIA STRATEGY**

EUPM planning, both in Brussels and Sarajevo, lacked a coherent media strategy and expertise. Although the decision to maintain a low media profile during EUPM planning was widely agreed, basic outreach was necessary and increasingly so as the PT began to expand in size.

- A media expert (PPIO) should have joined the PT at an earlier stage and charged with the development of a media strategy for the planning, as well as the operational, phase.

- PPIO personnel would have benefited from longer and media-specific induction training in Brussels, especially in relation to general EU structures, policies and activities.

- PT budget appropriation for outreach/publications/website establishment would have assisted media strategy development.

- More headquarters support (press releases/briefings/website) could have facilitated outreach.

- Liaison with EUSR/OHR media office worked well but was instigated late in the planning process. EUSR/OHR has considerable media resources and, had it been brought in earlier, may have been able to provide substantial assistance in the preparation of public information campaigns as well as in responding to particular issues/questions arising in the media (e.g. appeals against the IPTF certification process).
Recommendations

- Media strategies (international and on the ground) are an important part of a civilian crisis management operation. Adequate financial and personnel resources must be assigned to this in the planning phase.

- A separate media strategy aimed at Member States/international arena should be developed, in coordination with the mission, by Headquarters (Council and Commission press services). ¹

¹ This echoes points made in the Secretariat paper "Draft guidelines for ESDP Crisis Response Information Activities" (doc. 13817/02) and the Secretariat non-paper on EUPM Information Strategy of 19 November 2002.
Summary of main recommendations

Planning for EUPM was successful. The mission began operations on schedule on 1 January 2003 with personnel, equipment and programmes in place. The swift way in which EUPM has established itself in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the past four months and the positive feedback that continues to come from the field are the most telling indicators that the planning of the mission has met its objectives.

This review of the EUPM planning process demonstrates, however, that lessons can be drawn from the first EU crisis management operation for future crisis management activities.

I. PLANNING AND SET-UP

- EUPM planning did not follow all aspects of crisis management procedures elaborated in various EU concept papers. Generic planning and concept papers should aim to provide guidance, rather than impediments to planning. The EUPM experience demonstrates the importance of flexibility with regard to crisis management procedures and concepts.

- Fact-finding missions (FFM) are crucial to planning. Where carried out under restricted time frames, flexible mechanisms for review of planning estimates (including subsequent issue-specific FFMs) and regular updates of planning figures should be explored.

- The possibility of two Joint Actions, one to enable mission planning to start and a second to formally establish the mission on the basis of detailed figures, could be explored.

- The existence of some generic documents would facilitate civilian crisis management mission planning: standard administrative and financial procedures; a SOFA text, prior specific arrangements negotiated with Third States for their contribution to ESDP operations.
• Consideration could be given, within the databases of the Coordinating Mechanism for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, to pools of experts which could be used for the generation of mission planning teams. Training for EU mission planning should also be considered.

• Mission force generation is predicated on preselection by contributing States. Sending States must, therefore, ensure their candidates meet the skills and experience required by a mission.

II. COMMAND AND CONTROL

• The wide range of potential actors involved in the command and control of EU civilian crisis management, coupled with the imperative of providing missions with adequate support and back-up, reinforce the need for a single chain of command and avoidance of micromanagement.

• A designated point of contact in the Council Secretariat (mission desk officer/cell) is essential for crisis management missions in parallel, where applicable, with the project manager in the Commission responsible for the implementation of the CFSP budget.

• The option of temporary reinforcement of the Police Unit should be considered when police missions are undertaken.

• Information security must be addressed early in planning. Procedures for the release of classified information related to a crisis management operation should be systematically included in its Joint Action.
III. **Administrative and Financial Set-Up**

- The EUPM experience illustrates that the procurement and logistical aspects of a crisis management mission are crucial to mission operability and success.

- Mission planning must be as specific and detailed as possible. Changes in operational needs must be monitored closely and flagged early so that planning can be adjusted accordingly.

- The establishment of an administrative structure to perform procurement procedures and the timeline such procedures imply is a key element prior to the launching of an operation. The recruitment of qualified procurement experts at the earliest possible stage must be a priority for the mission.

IV. **Intra-EU Coordination**

- Where an EU presence already exists in a mission area, advance consideration could be given to possible synergies with the incoming mission.

- Coordination in Brussels between the relevant Commission and Council Secretariat officials could be enhanced through designated contact points, more regular and issue-specific meetings.

- Coordination in the field between the mission and the relevant Commission programmes is important to an EU comprehensive approach and could be further considered.
V. **COORDINATION WITH OTHER ACTORS (UN, THIRD STATES)**

- The transition from a UN to an EU operation, as was the case with EUPM, is also a possible scenario for future crisis management operations. Such transitions require advance strategic coordination between headquarters.

- The transition process must be regularly monitored and reviewed at headquarters and field level.

- The involvement of Third States in EU crisis management operations is a commitment of the EU. The current mechanism for enabling such contributions, however, is complex and laborious. A framework agreement for the contribution of Third States to ESDP operations could be useful, particularly where rapid deployment is required.

- The general question of Third States' contribution to common operating costs should be comprehensively addressed in coordination with Third States.

VI. **MEDIA STRATEGY**

- EUPM planning demonstrates the need for a coherent media strategy to be developed and articulated in the planning process. Adequate resources must be assigned to this.

- Media strategies on the ground are best elaborated by the planning team in the mission area. Media strategies aimed at a wider international audience should be developed, in coordination with the mission, by the headquarters (Council and Commission press services).