



**COUNCIL OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION**

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NOTE

from:	Presidency
to:	Delegations
Subject:	Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on European Union macro prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board - Presidency compromise

Delegations will find below a Presidency compromise on the above proposal, following the ECOFIN Trialogue and the Commission's informal proposal.

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

**on European Union macro prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a
European Systemic Risk Board**

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Unions, and in particular Article 114 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the Commission¹,

Having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank²,

Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee³,

Acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 294 of the Treaty⁴,

Whereas:

- (1) Financial stability is a precondition for the real economy to provide jobs, credit and growth. The financial crisis has revealed important shortcomings in financial supervision, which has failed to anticipate adverse macro-prudential developments and to prevent the accumulation of excessive risks within the financial system.

¹ OJ C , , p. .
² Decision XXXX
³ OJ C , , p. .
⁴ OJ C , , p. .

(1a) The European Parliament called regularly for the reinforcement of a true level playing field for all actors at the Union level while pointing out significant failures in the Union's supervision of ever more integrated financial markets (in its resolutions of 13 April 2000 on the Commission communication on implementing the framework for financial markets: Action Plan¹, of 25 November 2002 on prudential supervision rules in the Union², of 11 July 2007 on financial services policy (2005-2010) – White Paper³, of 23 September 2008 with recommendations to the Commission on hedge funds and private equity⁴, of 9 October 2008 with recommendations to the Commission on Lamfalussy follow-up: future structure of supervision⁵, of 22 April 2009 on the amended proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II)⁶ and of 23 April 2009 on the proposal for a regulation of the European parliament and of the Council on Credit Rating Agencies⁷).

¹ *OJ C 40, 7.2.2001, p. 453.*

² *OJ C 25 E, 29.1.2004, p. 394.*

³ *OJ C 175 E, 10.7.2008, p. xx.*

⁴ *OJ C 8 E, 14.1.2010, p. 26.*

⁵ *OJ C 9 E, 15.1.2010, p. 48.*

⁶ *Texts adopted, P6_TA(2009)0251.*

⁷ *Texts adopted, P6_TA(2009)0279.*

- (2) In November 2008, the Commission mandated a High Level Group chaired by Mr Jacques de Larosière (the "de Larosière Group") to make recommendations on how to strengthen European supervisory arrangements with a view to better protecting its citizens and rebuilding trust in the financial system.
- (3) In its final report presented on 25 February 2009 (*the de Larosière Report*), the de Larosière Group recommended, among other things, the establishment of a *Union* level body charged with overseeing risk in the financial system as a whole.
- (4) In its Communication entitled "Driving European Recovery" of 4 March 2009, the Commission welcomed and broadly supported the recommendations of the de Larosière Group. At its meeting of 19 and 20 March 2009, the European Council agreed on the need to improve the regulation and supervision of financial institutions within the EU and to use the report from the de Larosière Group as a basis for action.
- (5) In its Communication entitled "European Financial Supervision" of 27 May 2009, the Commission set out a series of reforms to the current arrangements for safeguarding financial stability at Union level, notably including the creation of a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) responsible for macro-prudential oversight. The Council on 9 June 2009 and the European Council at its meeting of 18 and 19 June supported the view of the Commission and welcomed the Commission's intention to bring forward legislative proposals so that the new framework is in place in the course of 2010. In line with the views of the Commission, it concluded inter alia that the ECB "should provide analytical, statistical, administrative and logistical support to the ESRB, also drawing on technical advice from national central banks and supervisors". The support provided by the ECB to the ESRB as well as the tasks conferred upon and assigned to the ESRB should be without prejudice to the principle of the independence of the ECB in the performance of its tasks pursuant to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

- (5a) Given the integration of international financial markets, there is a need for a strong commitment on the part of the Union at the global level. The ESRB should draw expertise from a high-level scientific committee and take on all the global responsibilities required in order to ensure that the voice of the Union is heard on financial stability matters, in particular in cooperating closely with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and all the partners of the Group of Twenty (G-20).
- (5b) The ESRB should contribute, inter alia, towards implementing the recommendations of the IMF, the FSB and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) to the G-20.
- (5c) The report on Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions also states that the assessment of systemic risk is likely to vary depending on the economic environment. It will also be conditioned by the financial infrastructure and crisis management arrangements, and the capacity to deal with failures when they occur. Institutions may be systemically important for local, national or international financial systems and economies. The key criteria helping to identify the systemic importance of markets and institutions are size (the volume of financial services provided by the individual component of the financial system), substitutability (the extent to which other components of the system can provide the same services in the event of a failure) and interconnectedness (linkages with other components of the system). An assessment based on those three criteria should be complemented with reference to financial vulnerabilities, the capacity of the institutional framework to deal with financial failures and should consider a wide range of additional factors such as, among others, the complexity of specific structures and business models, the degree of financial autonomy, intensity and scope of supervision, transparency of financial arrangements and linkages that may affect the overall risk of institutions.
- (5d) The ESRB's task should be to monitor and assess systemic risk in normal times for the purpose of mitigating the exposure of the system to the risk of failure of systemic components and enhancing the financial system's resilience to shocks. In this respect, the ESRB should ensure financial stability and mitigate the negative impacts on the internal market and the real economy. In order to accomplish its objectives, the ESRB should analyse all the relevant information.

- (6) The present European Union arrangements place too little emphasis on macro-prudential oversight and on inter-linkages between developments in the broader macro-economic environment and the financial system. Responsibility for macro-prudential analysis remains fragmented, and is conducted by various authorities at different levels with no mechanism to ensure that macro-prudential risks are adequately identified and that warnings and recommendations are issued clearly, followed up and translated into action. A proper functioning of Union and global financial systems and the mitigation of threats thereto require enhanced consistency between macro and micro supervision.
- (6a) This newly designed system of macro supervision requires credible and high-profile leadership. Therefore, given its key role and its international and internal credibility, and in the spirit of the de Larosière Report, the President of the ECB should be the Chair of the ESRB. In addition, the accountability requirements should be increased and the ESRB bodies should be able to draw on a wide range of experience, backgrounds and opinions.
- (6b) The de Larosière Report also states that macro-prudential supervision is not meaningful unless it can somehow impact on supervision at the micro-level whilst micro-prudential supervision cannot effectively safeguard financial stability without adequately taking account of macro-level developments.
- (6c) A European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) should be established, gathering the actors of financial supervision both at a national and at the Union level, to act as a network. Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation in accordance with Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, the parties to the ESFS should cooperate with trust and full mutual respect, in particular to ensure that appropriate and reliable information flows between them. At the Union level, the network should comprise the ESRB and three micro-supervisory authorities: the European Supervisory Authority (Banking), established by Regulation (EU) No .../2010, the European Supervisory Authority (Securities and Markets), established by Regulation (EU) No .../2010, and the European Supervisory Authority (Insurance and Occupational Pensions) established by Regulation (EU)

- (7) The European Union needs a specific body responsible for macro-prudential oversight across the EU financial system, which would identify risks to financial stability and, where necessary, issue risk warnings and recommendations for action to address such risks. Consequently, a European Systemic Risk Board should be established as a new independent body, covering all financial sectors as well as guarantee schemes. It should be responsible for conducting macro-prudential oversight at the European level and should have no legal personality.
- (7a) The ESRB should comprise a General Board, a Steering Committee, a Secretariat, an Advisory Technical Committee and an Advisory Scientific Committee. The establishment of the Advisory Technical Committee should take into account existing structures with a view to avoiding any duplication.
- (8) The ESRB should issue warnings and, where it deems necessary, recommendations either of a general nature or specific nature and shall be addressed in particular to the European Union as a whole or to one or more Member States, or to one or more of the European Supervisory Authorities, or to one or more national supervisory authorities with a specified timeline for the relevant policy response.
- (8a) A colour code should be elaborated by the ESRB, in order to allow interested parties better to assess the nature of the risk.
- (8b) If the ESRB detects a risk which may seriously jeopardise the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the Union's financial system, it should promptly inform the Council of the situation . Where the ESRB deems that the existence of an emergency situation could be in the offing, it should contact the Council and provide with an assessment of the situation. The Council would then assess the convenience of adopting a decision addressed to the ESAs determining the existence of an emergency situation.. In this process, due care of confidentiality is of the outmost importance.

- (9) In order to increase their weight and legitimacy, such warnings and recommendations should also be transmitted according to strict confidentiality rules to the Council, and the Commission and, where addressed to one or more national supervisory authority, to the European Supervisory Authorities. The deliberations of the Council should be prepared by the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) in accordance with its role as defined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). In order to prepare the Council discussions and provide timely policy advice to the Council, the EFC should be informed regularly and should receive the texts of the warnings and recommendations as soon as they have been adopted.
- (10) The ESRB should also monitor compliance with its recommendations, based on reports from addressees, in order to ensure that its warnings and recommendations are effectively followed. Addressees of recommendations should act on them and provide adequate justification in case of inaction ("act or explain" mechanism). If the ESRB judges that the reaction is inadequate, it shall inform, subject to strict confidentiality rules, the addressees, the Council and, where relevant, the European Supervisory Authorities concerned.
- (11) The ESRB should decide, on a case by case basis and after having informed the Council sufficiently in advance so that it is able to react, whether a recommendation should be kept confidential or made public, bearing in mind that public disclosure can help to foster compliance with the recommendations in certain circumstances.
- (12) The ESRB should report to the European Parliament and the Council at least annually, and more frequently in the event of widespread financial distress. Where appropriate, the European Parliament and the Council could invite the ESRB to examine specific issues related to financial stability.

- (13) The ECB and the national central banks should have a leading role in macro-prudential oversight because of their expertise and existing responsibilities in the area of financial stability. National supervisors should be involved in providing their specific expertise. The participation of micro-prudential supervisors in the work of the ESRB is essential to ensure that assessment of macro-prudential risk is based on complete and accurate information about developments in the financial system. Accordingly, the chairpersons of the European Supervisory Authorities should be members with voting rights. One representative of the national competent authorities of every Member State should attend meetings of the General Board without voting rights. In a spirit of openness, fifteen independent persons, should provide the ESRB with external expertise through the Advisory Scientific Committee.
- (14) The participation of a Member of the Commission will help to establish a link with the macro-economic and financial surveillance of the European Union, while the presence of the Chairman of the EFC will reflect the role of finance ministries and the Council in safeguarding financial stability and performing economic and financial oversight.
- (15) It is essential that the members of the ESRB perform their duties impartially and only consider the financial stability of the European Union as a whole. Where a consensus cannot be reached, voting on warnings and recommendations within the ESRB should not be weighted and decisions should as a rule be taken by a simple majority.
- (16) The interconnectedness of financial institutions and markets implies that the monitoring and assessment of potential systemic risks should be based on a broad set of relevant macro-economic and micro-financial data and indicators. Those systemic risks include risks of disruption to financial services caused by a significant impairment of all or parts of the Union's financial system that have the potential to have serious negative consequences for the internal market and the real economy. Any type of financial institution and intermediary, market, infrastructure and instrument has the potential to be systemically significant. The ESRB should therefore have access to all the information necessary to perform its duties while preserving the confidentiality of these data as required.

- (16a) The measures for the collection of information set out in this Regulation are necessary for the performance of the tasks of the ESRB and should be without prejudice to the legal framework of the European Statistical System (ESS) in the field of statistics. This Regulation should therefore be without prejudice to Regulation EC no 223/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009 on European statistics and to Council Regulation EC No 2533/98 of 23 November 1998 concerning the collection of statistical information by the European Central Bank.
- (17) Market participants can provide valuable input to the understanding of the evolutions affecting the financial system. Where appropriate, the ESRB should therefore consult private sector stakeholders (financial sector representatives, consumer associations, user groups in the financial services area established by the Commission or European Union legislation...) and give them a fair opportunity to provide their comments.
- (18) Given the integration of international financial markets at international level and the contagion risk of financial crises, the ESRB should coordinate with the International Monetary Fund and the newly established Financial Stability Board, which are expected to provide early warnings of macro-prudential risks at the global level.
- (19) The establishment of the ESRB should contribute directly to achieving the objectives of the Internal Market. The European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system is an integral part of the overall new supervisory arrangements in the European Union as the macro-prudential aspect is closely linked to the micro-prudential supervisory tasks attributed to the European Supervisory Authorities. Only with arrangements in place that properly acknowledge the interdependence between micro- and macro-prudential risks can all stakeholders have sufficient confidence to engage in cross-border financial activities. The ESRB should monitor and assess risks to financial stability arising from developments that can impact on a sectoral level or at the level of the financial system as a whole. By addressing such risks, the ESRB should directly contribute to an integrated European Union supervisory structure necessary to promote timely and consistent policy responses among the Member States, thus preventing diverging approaches and improving the functioning of the Internal Market.

(19a) The Court of Justice of the European communities in its judgment of 2 May 2006 in Case C-217/04 (United Kingdom/European Parliament and Council)¹ has acknowledged that Article 95 of the Treaty on the European Community (which has become Article 114 of the TFEU) relating to the adoption of measures for the approximation of legislation for the establishment and functioning of the internal market provides an appropriate legal basis for setting up a European Union body responsible for contributing to the implementation of a process of harmonisation", when the tasks conferred on such a body are closely related to the subject-matter of the acts approximating the national legislations. The ESRB contributes to the financial stability necessary for further financial integration in the internal market by monitoring systemic risks and issuing warnings and recommendations where appropriate. These tasks are closely linked to the objectives of the European Union legislation concerning the internal market for financial services. The ESRB should therefore be established on the basis of Article 114 of the TFEU.

(20) Since an effective macro-prudential oversight of the European Union financial system cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States because of the integration of the European financial markets, the European Union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve those objectives.

(20a) As suggested in the de Larosière Report, a step-by-step approach is necessary and the European Parliament and the Council should conduct a full review of the ESFS, the ESRB and the ESAs by ...*.

** OJ please insert date: three years after the entry into force of this Regulation.*

HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

¹ pt. 44 –not yet published

CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1
Establishment

1. A European Systemic Risk Board (hereinafter 'ESRB'), is established. It shall have its seat in Frankfurt.
2. The ESRB shall be part of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), the purpose of which is to ensure the supervision of the Union's financial system.
3. The ESFS shall comprise:
 - (a) the ESRB;
 - (b) the European Supervisory Authority (Securities and Markets) established by Regulation (EU) No .../2010 (ESMA);
 - (c) the European Supervisory Authority (Insurance and Occupational Pensions) established by Regulation (EU) No .../2010 (EIOPA);
 - (d) the European Supervisory Authority (Banking) established by Regulation (EU) No .../2010 (EBA);
 - (e) the Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities (Joint Committee) provided for by Article 40 of each of Regulation (EU) No .../... [EBA], No .../... [ESMA], No .../...[EIOPA];

- (f) the competent or supervisory authorities in the Member States as specified in the Union acts listed in Article 1(2) of Regulation (EU) No .../... [ESMA], Article 1(2) of Regulation (EU) No .../2009 [EIOPA] and Article 1(2) of Regulation (EU) No .../... [EBA];

- 4. Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation in accordance with Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, the parties to the ESFS shall cooperate with trust and full mutual respect, in particular to ensure that appropriate and reliable information flows between them.

Article 2

Definitions

For the purpose of this Regulation, the following definitions shall apply:

- (a) 'financial institution' means any undertaking covered by the legislation referred to in Article 1(2) of Regulation [EC no xx/2009 (EBA)], Regulation [EC no xx/2009 (ESMA)] and Regulation [EC no xx/2009 (EIOPA)], as well as any other undertaking or entity in the European Union whose main business is of a similar nature.
- (b) 'financial system' means all financial institutions, markets, *products* and market infrastructures;
- (c) 'systemic risk' means a risk of disruption in the financial system with the potential to have serious negative consequences for the internal market and the real economy All types of financial intermediaries, markets and infrastructure may be potentially systemically important to some degree.

Article 3
Mission, Objectives and Tasks

1. The ESRB shall be responsible for the macro-prudential oversight of the financial system within the Union in order to contribute to the prevention or mitigation of systemic risks to financial stability in the EU that arise from developments within the financial system and taking into account macro-economic developments, so as to avoid periods of widespread financial distress, and contribute to a smooth functioning of the internal market and thereby ensure a sustainable contribution of the financial sector to economic growth.
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the ESRB shall carry out the following tasks:
 - (a) determine and/or collect, and analyse all the relevant and necessary information, for the objectives described in paragraph 1;
 - (b) identify and prioritise systemic risks;
 - (c) issue warnings where such systemic risks are deemed to be significant and, where appropriate, make them public;
 - (d) issue recommendations for remedial action in response to the risks identified and, where appropriate, make them public;
 - (e) issue a confidential warning addressed to the Council when the ESRB deems that the existence of an emergency situation as defined in article 10 *of Regulation (EU) No .../... [ESMA]*, article 10 *of Regulation (EU) No .../... [EIOPA]* and Article 10 *of Regulation (EU) No .../... [EBA]*; could be in the offing. The ESRB shall provide with an assessment of the situation, in order for the Council to determine the need to adopt a decision addressed to the ESAs determining the existence of an emergency situation.

- (f) monitor the follow-up to warnings and recommendations;
- (g) cooperate closely with all the other parties to the ESFS and, where appropriate, provide the ESAs with the information on systemic risks required for the achievement of their tasks; in particular the ESRB shall, in collaboration with the ESAs, develop a common approach to the identification and measurement of systemic risk posed by financial institutions, including quantitative and qualitative indicators as appropriate
- (h) participate, where appropriate, in the Joint Committee;
- (i) coordinate with international financial organizations, particularly the International Monetary Fund and the Financial Stability Board as well as the relevant bodies in third countries on matters related to macro-prudential oversight;
- (j) carry out other related tasks as specified in European Union legislation.

CHAPTER II

ORGANISATION

Article 4

Structure

1. The ESRB shall have a General Board, a Steering Committee, a Secretariat, an Advisory Technical Committee and an Advisory Scientific Committee.
2. The General Board shall take the decisions necessary to ensure the performance of the tasks entrusted to the ESRB.
3. The Steering Committee shall assist in the decision-making process of the ESRB by preparing the meetings of the General Board, reviewing the documents to be discussed and monitoring the progress of the ESRB's ongoing work.
4. The Secretariat shall be responsible for the day-to-day business of the ESRB. It shall provide high-quality analytical, statistical, administrative and logistical support to the ESRB under the direction of the Chair of the General Board in accordance with Council Regulation (EU) No .../2010 [ESRB]. It shall also draw on technical advice from ESAs, national central banks and national supervisors.
5. The Advisory Scientific and Technical Committees referred to in Articles 12 and 12a shall provide advice and assistance on issues relevant to the work of the ESRB.

Article 5
Chairmanship

1. The Chair of the ESRB shall be elected for a term of 5 years by and from the Members of the General Board who are also members of the General Council of the ECB.
 - (a) The first Vice-Chair shall be elected by and from the Members of the General Council of the ECB for a term of 5 years, with regard to the need for a balanced representation of Member States overall and between those within and outside the euro area. He or she may be re-elected once.
 - (b) The second Vice-Chair shall be the Chair of the Joint Committee as appointed pursuant to Article XX of Regulations
 - (c) The Chair and Vice-Chairs shall present to the European Parliament, during a public hearing, how they intend to discharge their duties under this Regulation.
2. The Chair shall preside at the meetings of the General Board and the Steering Committee.
3. The Vice-Chairs, in order of precedence, shall preside at the General Board and/or the Steering Committee when the Chair cannot participate in a meeting.
4. If the term of office of the Members of the General Council of the ECB elected as first Vice-Chair ends before the completion of the 5 year term or if for any reason the first Vice Chair is unable to discharge their duties, a new first Vice-Chair shall be elected in accordance with paragraph 1a.
5. The Chair shall represent the ESRB externally.

Article 6
General Board

1. The following persons shall be Members of the General Board with voting rights
 - (a) the President and the Vice-President of the ECB;
 - (b) the Governors of the national central banks;
 - (c) a Member of the European Commission;
 - (d) the Chairperson of the European Banking Authority;
 - (e) the Chairperson of the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority;
 - (f) the Chairperson of the European Securities and Markets Authority;
 - (g) the President and the two Vice Presidents of the Advisory Scientific Committee.
2. The following persons shall be Members of the General Board without voting rights:
 - (a) one high level representative per Member State of the competent national supervisory authorities, in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article;
 - (b) the President of the Economic and Financial Committee.
3. With regard to the representation of national supervisory authorities, the respective high level representatives shall rotate depending on the item discussed, unless the national supervisory authorities have agreed on a common representative.
4. The General Board shall establish the Rules of Procedure for the ESRB.

Article 7
Impartiality

1. When participating in the activities of the General Board and of the Steering Committee or when conducting any other activity relating to the ESRB, the Members of the ESRB shall perform their duties impartially and solely in the interest of the European Union as a whole. They shall neither seek nor take instructions from Member States, Union institutions or any other public or private body.
- 1a. The Members of the General Board (voting and non-voting) may not have a function in the financial industry.
2. Neither Member States, European Union institutions nor any other public or private body shall seek to influence the members of the ESRB in the performance of their ESRB tasks.

Article 8
Professional secrecy

1. Members of the General Board of the ESRB and any other persons who work or who have worked for or in connection with the ESRB (including the relevant staff of central banks, Advisory Scientific Committee, Advisory Technical Committee, ESAs and competent national supervisory authorities of the Member States), shall be required not to disclose information covered by professional secrecy, even after their duties have ceased.
2. Information received by Members of the ESRB may only be used in the course of their duties and in performing the tasks set out in Article 3(2).

3. Without prejudice to Article 16 and the application of criminal law, any confidential information received by the persons referred to in paragraph 1 whilst performing their duties, may not be divulged to any person or authority whatsoever, except in summary or aggregate form, such that individual financial institutions cannot be identified.
4. The ESRB shall , together with the European Supervisory Authorities, agree on and put in specific confidentiality procedures in order to safeguard information regarding individual financial institutions, or information where individual financial institutions can be identified.

Article 9
Meetings of the General Board

1. Ordinary plenary meetings of the General Board shall be convened by the Chair of the General Board and shall occur at least four times a year. Extraordinary meetings may be convened at the initiative of the Chair of the General Board or at the request of at least one third of the Members with voting rights.
2. Each Member shall be present in person at the meetings of the General Board and may not be represented.
3. By way of derogation from paragraph 2, a Member who is prevented from attending the meetings for a period of at least three months may appoint an alternate. That Member may also be replaced by a person who has been formally appointed under the rules governing the institution concerned for the substitution of representatives on a temporary basis.
- 3a. Where appropriate, high-level representatives from international financial organizations carrying out activities directly related to the tasks of the ESRB may be invited to attend the meetings of the General Board.
4. Participation in the work of the ESRB may be open to high level representatives of the relevant authorities from third countries in particular EEA countries. Arrangements may be made by the ESRB specifying, in particular, the nature, scope and procedural aspects of the involvement of these countries in the work of the ESRB. These arrangements may provide for representation, on an ad-hoc basis, as an observer, on the General Board and should only concern one specific item on the agenda.
5. The proceedings of the meetings shall be confidential.

Article 10
Voting modalities of the General Board

1. Each Member of the General Board with a voting right shall have one vote.
2. Without prejudice to the voting procedures set out in Articles 18.1, the General Board shall act by a simple majority of Members present with voting rights. In the event of a tie, the Chair shall have the casting vote.
3. A quorum of two-thirds of the Members with voting rights is needed for any vote to be taken by the General Board. If the quorum is not met, the Chair may convene an extraordinary meeting at which decisions may be taken with a quorum of one third. The rules of procedure shall set an adequate notice applicable for convening an extraordinary meeting.
- 3a. By derogation from paragraph 2, a majority of two-thirds of the votes shall be required to adopt a recommendation or to make a warning or recommendation public.

Article 11
Steering Committee

1. The Steering Committee shall be composed of the following:
 - (a) the Chair of the ESRB;
 - (b) the first Vice-Chair of the ESRB;
 - (c) the Vice-President of the ECB;
 - (d) four other members of the General Board who are also members of the General Council of the ECB, with regard to the need for a balanced representation of Member States between those within and outside the euro area. They shall be elected by and from among the Members of the General Board who are also members of the General Council of the ECB for a period of three years;

- (e) a Member of the European Commission;
- (f) the Chairperson of the European Supervisory Authority (Banking);
- (g) the Chairperson of the European Supervisory Authority (Insurance and Occupational Pensions);
- (h) the Chairperson of the European Supervisory Authority (Securities and Markets);
- (i) the President of the Economic and Financial Committee.
- (j) the President of the Advisory Scientific Committee

Any vacancy for an elected Member of the Steering Committee shall be filled by the election of a new Member by the General Board.

2. Meetings of the Steering Committee shall be convened by the Chair at least quarterly, before each meeting of the General Board. The Chair may also convene ad-hoc meetings.

Article 12
Advisory Scientific Committee

1. The Advisory Scientific Committee shall be composed of 15 experts representing a wide range of skills and experiences proposed by the Steering Committee and approved by the General Board for a four-year, renewable mandate.
2. The Chair and the two vice-Chairs of the Advisory Scientific Committee shall be appointed by the General Board following a proposal from the Chair of the General Board and represent the sectors of banking, markets and insurance and occupational pensions. The chairmanship should rotate between these 3 persons..
3. The Committee shall perform the tasks referred to in Article 4(5) at the request of the Chair of the General Board
4. The ESRB Secretariat shall support the work of the Advisory Scientific Committee and the Head of the Secretariat shall participate in the meetings.
5. Where appropriate, the Advisory Scientific Committee shall organize consultations at an early stage with stakeholders such as market participants, consumer bodies, academic experts, in an open and transparent manner, while keeping in mind the confidentiality requirement.
6. The Advisory Scientific Committee shall be provided with all necessary means in order to successfully complete its tasks.

Article 12(a)
Advisory Technical Committee

1. The Advisory Technical Committee shall be composed of the following:
 - (a) a representative of each national central bank and a representative of the ECB;
 - (b) one representative per Member State of the competent national supervisory authority;

- (c) one representative of the European Banking Authority;
- (d) one representative of the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority;
- (e) one representative of the European Securities and Markets Authority;
- (f) two representatives of the Commission;
- (g) one representative of the Economic and Financial Committee;
- (h) the chairman of the Advisory Scientific Committee.

The supervisory authorities of each Member State shall choose one representative in the Committee. With regard to the representation of national supervisory authorities, the respective high level representatives shall rotate depending on the item discussed, unless national supervisory authorities have agreed on a common representative.

2. The Chair and the two vice-Chairs of the Advisory Technical Committee shall be appointed by the General Board following a proposal from the Chair of the General Board.
3. The Committee shall perform the tasks referred to in Article 4(5) at the request of the Chair of the General Board.
4. The ESRB Secretariat shall support the work of the Advisory Technical Committee and the Head of the Secretariat shall participate in the meetings.
5. The Advisory Technical Committee shall be provided with all necessary means in order to successfully complete its tasks.

Article 13

Other sources of advice

In performing its tasks, the ESRB shall seek, where appropriate, the views of relevant private sector stakeholders.

Article 14

Access to documents

Deleted.

Chapter III

Tasks

Article 15

Collection and exchange of information

1. The ESRB shall provide the European Supervisory Authorities with the information on risks necessary for the achievement of their tasks.
2. The European Supervisory Authorities, the ESCB, the Commission, the national supervisory authorities and national statistics authorities shall cooperate closely with the ESRB and provide all the information necessary for the fulfilment of its tasks in accordance with European Union legislation.
3. Subject to Article 21.2 of the Regulations establishing the EBA, ESMA and EIOPA, the ESRB may request information from the European Supervisory Authorities, as a rule in summary or collective form such that individual financial institutions cannot be identified.
4. Before requesting information in accordance with this Article, the ESRB shall first take account of the existing statistics produced, disseminated and developed by the European Statistical System and the ESCB.
5. If the requested data are not available to those Authorities or are not made available in a timely manner, the ESRB may request the data from the ESCB, national supervisory authorities or national statistics authorities. When the data is not available at the aforementioned authorities, the ESRB may request the data from the Member State concerned, without prejudice to the prerogatives respectively conferred on the Council, the Commission (Eurostat), the ECB, the Eurosystem and the ESCB in the field of statistics and data collection.

6. Where the ESRB requests data that is not in summary or collective form, the reasoned request shall explain why data on the respective individual financial institution is deemed to be systemically relevant, and necessary, considering the prevailing market situation.
7. Before each request for information which is not in summary or collective form, the ESRB shall duly consult the relevant European Supervisory Authority in order to ensure that the request is justified and proportionate. If the relevant European Supervisory Authority does not consider the request to be justified and proportionate, it shall, without delay, send the request back to the ESRB and ask for additional justification. After the ESRB has provided the relevant European Supervisory Authority with such additional justification, the requested data shall be transmitted to the ESRB from the addressee of the request, provided that the addressee has legal access to the relevant data.

Article 16

Warnings and recommendations

1. When significant risks to the achievement of the objective in article 3(1) are identified, the ESRB shall provide warnings and, where appropriate, issue recommendations for remedial action, including, where appropriate, for legislative initiatives
2. Warnings or recommendations issued by the ESRB in accordance with points (c) and (d) of Article 3(2) may be either of a general or specific nature and shall be addressed in particular to the Union as a whole or to one or more Member States, or to one or more of the European Supervisory Authorities, or to one or more national supervisory authorities. In case a warning or a recommendation is addressed to one or more supervisory authorities, the Member State concerned shall be informed thereof. Recommendations shall include a specified timeline for the policy response. Recommendations may also be addressed to the Commission in respect of the relevant Union legislation.

3. The warnings or recommendations shall, at the same time as they are transmitted to the addressees according to paragraph 2, also be transmitted according to strict confidentiality rules to the Council and the Commission and, where addressed to one or more national supervisory authority, to the European Supervisory Authorities.
4. In order to enhance the awareness of risks in the European economy and to prioritize such risks, the ERSB, in close cooperation with the ESFS, shall elaborate a colour-coded system corresponding to situations of different risk levels.

Once the criteria of such classification have been elaborated, its warnings and recommendations will indicate, on a case-by-case basis, and where appropriate, to which category the risk belongs.

Article 17

Follow-up of the ESRB recommendations

1. Where a recommendation referred to in letter (d) of Article 3(2) is addressed to the Commission, one or more Member States, one or more European Supervisory Authorities, or one or more national supervisory authorities, the addressees shall communicate the actions undertaken in response to the recommendations to the ESRB and to the Council and provide adequate justification in case of inaction (“act or explain”). Where relevant, European Supervisory Authorities, shall, subject to strict confidentiality rules, be informed without delay by the ESRB of the answer received.
2. If the ESRB decides that its recommendation has not been followed and that the addressees have failed to explain their inaction appropriately, it shall, subject to strict confidentiality rules, inform the addressees, the Council and, where relevant, the European Supervisory Authorities concerned.

3. Where the ESRB has made a decision under paragraph 2 on a recommendation made public following the procedure set by Article 18 (1), the European Parliament may invite the President of the ESRB to present it and the addressee may request to participate in an exchange of views.

Article 18

Public warnings and recommendations

1. The General Board of the ESRB shall decide, after having informed the Council sufficiently in advance so that it is able to react, whether a warning or a recommendation should be made public on a case-by-case basis. Notwithstanding Article 10(3), a quorum of two-third shall always apply in respect of decisions taken under this paragraph.
2. Where the General Board of the ESRB decides to make a warning or recommendation public, it shall inform the addressee(s) in advance.
3. The addressees of warnings and recommendations released by the ESRB should be provided with the rights of making public its views and reasoning as well in response to the warning and recommendation published by the ESRB.
4. Where the General Board of the ESRB decides not to make a warning or a recommendation public, the addressee and where appropriate, the Council and the European Supervisory Authorities, shall take all the measures necessary for the protection of their confidential nature.

CHAPTER IV
FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 19
Accountability and reporting obligations

1. At least annually, but more frequently in the event of widespread financial distress, the ESRB Chair shall be invited to an annual hearing in the European Parliament, marking the publication of the ESRB's annual report to the European Parliament and the Council. Those hearings shall be made in a different context from the monetary dialogue between the European Parliament and the President of the ECB.
2. The reports referred to in this Article shall contain the information that in accordance with Article 18, the General Board of the ESRB decides should be made public. The reports shall be made available to the public.
3. The ESRB shall also examine specific issues at the invitation of the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission.
4. The European Parliament may request the President of the ESRB to attend a hearing of the competent Committees of the European Parliament.
5. The President of the ESRB shall hold confidential discussions on a quarterly basis behind closed door with a restricted group of members of Parliament on the ongoing activity of the ESRB. An agreement shall be concluded between the ESRB and the European Parliament on the detailed modalities of organising this meeting, with a view to ensure the full confidentiality in accordance with Article 8.

Article 20
Review clause

The European Parliament and the Council shall examine this Regulation on the basis of a report from the Commission three years after its entry into force and shall determine whether the missions and organisation of the ESRB need to be reviewed after having received an opinion from the ECB and the European Supervisory Authorities.

Article 21
Entry into force

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels,

For the European Parliament
The President

For the Council
The President
