COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Brussels, 23 July 2004

11616/04

LIMITE

COSDP 456
RECH 153
COMPET 130
IND 103
TRANS 259
POLARM 25

NOTE

From :	Secretariat
To :	Political and Security Committee
Subject :	Draft document "A European Space Policy: Security and Defence aspects"

1. Following a detailed study of the military need issued by the Hellenic presidency on 15 March 2003, the importance of space applications and functions was recognised by the Council on 19 May 2003 as well as in the Presidency report on ESDP, endorsed by the European Council at Thessaloniki on 19-20 June 2003.

2. On 25th June 2003, the PSC contributed to the consultation process of the Green Paper on European Space Policy from the Commission and the European Space Agency, (doc 11209/03 RESTREINT), recognising the importance of space applications and functions to support and enhance the EU capabilities to carry out crisis management operations.

3. On 27 November 03, the Commission made a presentation on the White Paper on "Space: a new European frontier for an expanding Union - An Action Plan for Implementing the European Space Policy" (circulated as doc 14886/03 17 Nov 03) to the PMG, which then discussed the matter.

4. With the aim of furthering the general discussions on the importance of space applications, the Italian Presidency organised a seminar entitled "Space and Security Policy in Europe" in Rome (2 December 2003). A report, drafted together by six European research institutes, was presented to this seminar, and further published by the EU ISS in December 2003 (ISS occasional papers n° 48).

5. On 1 December 2003, the PSC reiterated its position that further and regular interpillar reflection is needed to ensure that the security and defence aspects of CFSP and ESDP are taken into account during the deliberations on an EU Space Policy and its associated programmes. This interpillar reflection should take into account the work being done in the context of other EU initiatives including the ECAP project groups (such as Space Assets) identified in the Capabilities Conference Declaration, which was endorsed at the GAERC 19 May 2003 and other possible future projects linked to ESDP. In addition, the PSC noted that chapter 3.4 of the Commission White Paper on Space makes recommendations. On this basis, initial work began in Council bodies on possible ESDP aspects of the future EC Space Programme. This work would benefit from clear guidelines.

6. At the same time, a Group of Personalities (GoP)[1] developed the cornerstones of an EU Security Research Programme and the contribution it could make to address the new security challenges. It recognised the crucial character of Space based assets for a secure Europe. A panel of experts gathered by the European Commission is now working on the possible defence and security aspects of the future EC space programme.

7. On this background, it was felt useful that the EU Council developed a Space Policy, as a guideline for the co-ordination of all actions in the field of the use of Space assets for ESDP purposes. The attached draft is therefore submitted to EU Member States for further development as appropriate.

[1] Co-chaired by European Commissioners Busquin and Liikanen, composed of Security Industry Chairmen and Chief Executives, serving Members of the European Parliament, Heads of major Reserach Institutes, high-level European Defence Ministry officials, two high-level political figures (Artisaari / Bildt), Commissioner Patten and the High Representative for the CFSP.

DRAFT

"A European Space Policy: Security and Defence aspects"

I. INTRODUCTION

The European Security Strategy endorsed by the European Council in Brussels on 12 December 2003 has clearly stated that the European Union needed to be more active, more coherent and more capable. It has defined the main threats that needed to be addressed, among them:

- the terrorist threat, and its organised crime linkages;
- the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), addressed inter alia through verification of the provisions of the Treaties;
- the regional conflicts and their consequences.

It also recognised that the first line of defence will often be abroad. This is true for all major threats, which causes, if not the actors, are most often rooted in remote countries.

Reliable information is the basis for early warning, which is itself the condition for early action and conflict prevention. It is also essential to prevent proliferation, and to ensure world-wide verification of treaties : our own experience in Europe shows that security may be reinforced by confidence building measures and armaments control systems. The extension of organised crime and recent terrible acts of terrorism on our own territory have also shown the need for ensuring appropriate control of the crossing of our borders by illegal immigrants or goods, and to reinforce our capabilities for the vital fight against international terrorism.

The EU also needs to achieve an adequate level of **operational capabilities**, to ensure its own security as well as for contributing to the world security, in line with its status as a world-wide actor.

Furthermore, **the security dimension inherent to all space activities cannot be neglected.** A space programme which would not take into account the security aspects would introduce new built-in threats to the security of all users, and mainly its originator and allies, as demonstrated by concerns put forward by the US in the framework of the Galiléo programme.

For now more than 40 years, space has brought a valuable contribution to the capabilities of the major world powers. At the opening of the 21st century, with the new strategic environment and being one of the major global actors on the world scene, Europe cannot be absent from space.

II. THE ADDED VALUE OF SPACE FOR CFSP/ESDP.

Information on water resources, massive pollution, proliferation activities, movements of population including illegal immigration, all kinds of trafficking and many other elements which constitute the warning factors of major threats, is essential for conflict prevention and fight against all less visible threats to European security. But this information is not easy to collect with due respect to international law and foreign states' sovereignty. Space-based sensors have the advantage of unrestricted access over areas of operation and areas that are otherwise difficult to gain access to for political or military reasons. Their mere existence puts also political pressure and practical constraints on those who wish to have hidden activities or even conceal hostile activities. They might also constitute the only means allowing for timely detection of some of the most dangerous forms of terrorist attacks, and for providing where necessary proofs on the origin of the attack to the international community.

But ensured and reliable access to comprehensive strategic and Early Warning information provided from space-based observation assets is still today the privilege of a very limited number of States.

In the 21st century, space assets contribute to many capabilities needed for any military operation. They can also provide very valuable support to civilian aspects of Crisis Management Operations (CMO) such as, for example, precisely assessing the consequences of a disaster or the needs for reconstruction. Capabilities such as intelligence gathering and precision navigation, can provide an invaluable advantage in the field. Secure and reliable communications are also essential for exercising political control and strategic direction of any operation. On external theatres, these capabilities are often greatly dependant upon space-based assets, all the more where local infrastructure is deficient.

Space-based capabilities are already integral to any nation’s operational doctrines and processes. By fully integrating space capabilities into military operations, force commanders are better able to tailor their campaign planning and operations to more effectively employ available forces and achieve objectives at the least risk and cost. This implies the assumption that these assets are/will be available when needed.

In providing valuable elements to the early decision-making process, to the planning and to the execution of military and civilian tasks, space assets could greatly contribute to making the EU more capable in the field of crisis management. They would at the same time contribute to fighting other recognised threats to the security of the Union.

But while civilian space in the EU is already at the leading edge of the world's technology, defence applications are still limited to a few individual Member States' initiatives. Although significant capabilities already exist within EU Member States, the EU as such cannot make full use of these capabilities, which have been developed and financed for national objectives, objectives which remain fully valid.

Noting that fulfilling the tactical needs of the forces may remain a national prerogative for the foreseeable future, it is at least necessary to develop a policy for providing the EU, over the long term, with permanent access to the necessary assets for early detection of crisis, crisis prevention and crisis management at the political and strategic levels. It is also necessary to weight the benefits which could be provided by the force multiplier effect of space assets on EU's operational capabilities, including in the field of interoperability of communication systems.

III. THE ROLES OF THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES

Some EU Member States have included space assets in their military priorities, but this effort is very unevenly shared. France alone used to spend on space more than twice as much as all other EU Member States together. However, recently, significant programmes were undertaken by several States, and preserved despite serious budgetary difficulties, thus showing a considerable level of political will and acute consciousness of the odds at stake.

Military capability will continue to remain within the remit of Member States, unless the European Council decides unanimously otherwise. This should not prevent Member States to look for achieving the best possible level of capability through extensive co-operation, sharing and pooling of assets and capabilities wherever possible, within the limits acceptable with regard to their national sovereignty and vital interests. Many could even improve the conditions of their national sovereignty through some access to strategic capabilities that they do not own yet.

In recent years, EU Member states were several times confronted with the difficult task of making extremely significant and difficult, individual as well as collective decisions: 1st Gulf war, Kosovo, Afghanistan, 2nd Gulf war, genocide in African countries. Unanimity is the rule for making decisions on ESDP matters. It is certainly more difficult to achieve a political consensus if all Member States do not enjoy the same level of access to information relating to these decisions. Making decisions on the basis of too scarce or uncontrollable information can indeed be a source for serious mistakes or delays in decision-making with significant and sometimes dramatic consequences. On the opposite**, access to unbiased information minimises uncertainty and increases the chances for prudent and timely political decisions.** To be a world-wide actor, ready to share responsibility for international security, Europe cannot take that chance. Providing all Member States with access to appropriate strategic information sources is therefore essential for forging coherence of views on critical topics. Confidence in reliable, controllable, shared information is the basis for mutual trust among Member States during decision-making as well as for solidarity in action.

With the continuous progress of European integration in major aspects of economy and citizen's life, vital interests are more and more common to EU Member States. Actually**, each State should consider the exact percentage of the use of space systems that it must have under national control for the sake of its national needs, compared to the part that could be shared with other EU Member States that also share with it common vital interests.** If the EU is the owner or the manager of a system, Member States would thus need to be able to draw on it as much as they need for national purposes, while using it together where common interests are at stake[2], and therefore avoiding unnecessary duplications. Under this condition, changing to a common EU system should not lead to additional charges for individual countries when comparing to purely national programmes. A collective data processing capability could also be developed, possibly based upon extension of existing EU SATCEN and JRC/Ispra capabilities, provided there is an appropriate provision for its national use.

IV.DESIGNING A GLOBAL EU SPACE POLICY

In USA, space programmes have historically been driven by the military needs and for the largest part financed by the Defence sector. On the contrary, European space has been developed as an almost purely civilian endeavour. As a consequence, defence space based assets launched by European States are often just an extra load "piggy-backing" on civilian platforms. For example, this is the case for almost

[2] Experience with Hélios II has shown that 30% of the programming was common, to be compared to the respective shares in the programme.

all encrypted communication systems. In addition, where purely military satellites exist, they usually derive from civilian ones : for example, the French-Italian-Spanish Hélios 1 observation satellites are improved "clones" of the Spot series.

Any comprehensive European space policy should not attempt to break away from this heritage, but build on it. This is all the more appropriate when considering the dramatic expansion of dual-use technologies. Therefore, Europe should not attempt at designing a stand-alone "Defence" space policy, but rather **an integrated space policy**, drawing as much as possible on existing and potential synergies.

V. THE WAY FORWARD.

The European Communities Space Programme, including Galiléo, EGNOS, GMES and SATCOM, and their obvious dual-use potential, is certainly a cornerstone. When adding to it existing and planned national military satellites (Hélios 1 and 2, Sar-lupe, Cosmos/Skymed, Xstar-Eur, Pleïades, Cerise, Syracuse, Skynet, Sicral…), the civilian satellites with clear dual-use capabilities (such as Meteosat or SPOT), and the independent launching capability provided by the Ariane family and the Kourou launching pad, it looks like the EU had already almost the status of a space power.
But it has not.

Benefits provided by space observation data are multiplied by ten through correlation between different sources (visible, radar, infrared). The operational potential of a comprehensive panoply of space assets is therefore enormous, while ownership of a single system can only provide marginal benefits. Therefore, to become a true space power, Europe needs to bring together its civilian and military programmes, share its resources and organise collective access to the subsequent capabilities in a way which allows Member States to profit also nationally from the multiplier effect.

It should be noted in this regard that the principle of arrangements allowing the EU to benefit from several nationally developed military programmes has been agreed by Ministers of Defence of interested Member States, and that work is already ongoing on their contents. An arrangement allowing the EU to have access to these military assets, as well as to civilian assets with dual-use capabilities, would constitute a first step towards European space capacities. In the medium term, Member States should aim at complementing this pool of capacities through voluntary contributions, while in the longer term a global vision of space capabilities needed for security and defence as well as for other purposes should drive comprehensive future programmes.

The main flaw when trying to bring together several space programmes is interoperability. In the **absence of any agreed standard**, every space system has its own technical specifications. It is therefore almost impossible today to have a common ground segment, able to receive and process data provided by the different available sources. What is understandable for a single national programme becomes a terrible handicap and unacceptable waste of money when considering pooled resources and multiple systems. Procurement of several separate ground equipment for national purposes would not be affordable by States with limited financial resources, and would be a waste of resources at the European level.

On the opposite, an agreed common standard for future programmes, including defence-oriented ones, might allow over the long term for a dramatic limitation of the numbers of ground assets needed to receive and process data from all space-based sources. Furthermore, considering that in a comprehensive space programme, the cost of the ground segment can be even higher than the cost of the space segment, limiting the types of ground segments would thus lead to further considerable savings on assets as well as on scarce and costly human specialist resource, enhancing affordability by all Member States. For commercial products, it could also be a very valuable means of increasing competitiveness of European products on the world market, in line with the objectives set at Lisbon.

As a consequence, and without prejudging any further action, **one priority task for Europe should be to define common standards** for all planned and future space programmes. Another practical step towards rationalisation was the agreement by six EU Member States on a Common Operational Requirement[3]. Extension of this agreement to all EU Member States would constitute a great improvement in the field of rationalisation of security and defence capabilities.

But sharing a system means that Member States will get information on each others' centres of interest, and that is always seen with some reluctance by the respective intelligence communities. Although sharing the use of assets does not mean in any case forcing individual States to share national intelligence, overcoming this reluctance will require a strong political will by Member States, based on an improved sense of solidarity and acknowledged sharing of vital interests. This does not prevent individual Member States from retaining own national interests. With a view to a fair sharing of the burden, when considering contributions to a collective system, Member States could then take into account participation in kind and/or in cash versus the requested share to be used for national purposes.

[3] "Besoin Opérationnel Commun" (BOC) signed by six European Staffs (B, D,E, F, I, UK)

VI. CONCLUSION

The current EU Space Strategy[4] developed jointly by the European Commission (EC) and the European Space Agency (ESA) focuses on transport, environment and research. An EU space programme is already taking place, as is highlighted by the development of GALILEO and GMES EU's initiatives, respectively in the field of navigation by satellite and Global Monitoring for Environment and Security. But this Strategy had not taken into account the developments regarding the ESDP. This should be done in a comprehensive Space Strategy.

To be more active, more coherent and more capable, and to become a world-wide global actor, ready to share responsibility for international security, Europe must have access to the best affordable capabilities for autonomous political assessment, sound decision-making, and effective conduct of actions. Space assets can provide an invaluable contribution to this endeavour. ESDP requirements should therefore be fully incorporated into an overall EU Space Policy, as foreseen by the European Constitution[5].

Becoming a global space power is undoubtedly out of reach for any individual EU member State, but is achievable by all Member States together in the EU framework. Sharing and pooling resources, drawing on dual use technology and common standards, would certainly allow over time for cost-effective collective achievements above all expectations. This requires a strong political will by Member States, based on an improved sense of solidarity and acknowledged sharing of vital interests. It does not however require giving up any essential part of national sovereignty. At this price, Europe could actually become a major global actor on the world scene.

---

[4] Council Resolution of 16 November 2000 on a European space strategy. Official Journal C 371 , 23/12/2000 P. 0002 – 0003.

[5] Art. 13.3 and III-155