




**COUNCIL OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION**

Brussels, 13 February 2004

**5744/1/04
REV 1**

LIMITE

ENFOPOL 14



NOTE

from : Presidency
to : Council

Subject : Council Recommendation concerning a handbook for the co-operation between
Member States to avoid terrorist acts at the Olympic Games and other comparable
sporting events

1. Attached is a draft Council Recommendation concerning a handbook for the co-operation between Member States to avoid terrorist acts at the Olympic Games and other comparable sporting events.
2. The handbook has been drawn up in the margins of the Working Party on Terrorism and agreed by all delegations participating in its preparation.
3. In light of the urgency of the matter (the Olympic Games will take place in a few months), the Article 36 Committee agreed on the handbook at its meeting on 10 February 2004 and Coreper agreed on it at its meeting on 11 February 2004.
4. On this basis, Coreper invites the Council to adopt the attached draft Council Recommendation concerning a handbook for co-operation between Member States to avoid terrorist acts at the Olympic Games and other comparable sporting events.

COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION

of

CONCERNING A HANDBOOK FOR THE CO-OPERATION BETWEEN MEMBER STATES TO AVOID TERRORIST ACTS AT THE OLYMPIC GAMES AND OTHER COMPARABLE SPORTING EVENTS

The Council of the European Union,

Having regard to the conclusions of the 7th and 8th meetings of the Task Force of Chiefs of Police of EU Member States,

WHEREAS:

- (1) The European Union's objective is, *inter alia*, to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice by developing common action among the Member States in the field of police co-operation.
- (2) Major international sporting events face particular terrorist threats primarily associated with the public interest in these events. In this regard, it should be recalled that in the past terrorists have used the Olympic Games as a platform for their activities.
- (3) Major international sporting events - such as two Olympic Games, the Football World Cup, the America's Cup of sailing, the Mediterranean Games, the Rugby World Cup and the World Athletics Championship, among others - are going to be held in several Member States of the European Union between 2004 and 2007.
- (4) It is important that the competent authorities (including security services and police forces) use a security handbook at the 2004 Olympic Games and other comparable international sporting events.

- (5) Following the conclusion of the Olympic Games the handbook should be reviewed and updated as appropriate,

HEREBY RECOMMENDS THAT THE MEMBER STATES

- (1) Step up co-operation, in particular practical co-operation between competent authorities and services (including security services and police forces) in order to ensure public security at the 2004 Olympic Games and other comparable international sporting events.
- (2) To that end ensure that the handbook annexed hereto is made available to relevant competent authorities.

SECURITY HANDBOOK

**CO-OPERATION BETWEEN MEMBER STATES TO AVOID TERRORIST ACTS
AT THE OLYMPIC GAMES AND OTHER COMPARABLE SPORTING EVENTS**

I. INTRODUCTION

- 1.1 The purpose of this handbook is to serve as a practical instrument providing guidelines and inspiration for competent authorities in Europe undertaking the responsibility for security at the 2004 Olympic Games and other comparable international sporting events.
- 1.2 While this handbook deals with averting terrorist threats related to the Olympic Games and other comparable sporting events consideration must also be given to public order matters. In this regard the attention of Member States is drawn to Council Resolution of 6 December 2001 concerning a handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved (2002/C 22/01); and Security handbook for the use of police authorities and services at international events such as meetings of the European Council (12637/3/02 REV 3 ENFOPOL 123).
- 1.3 The principles set out in this handbook should only be applied where appropriate and useful as well as in full compliance with national legislation.
- 1.4 The handbook is an evolving instrument to be amended and adjusted over time in accordance with future experiences and development of best practices with reference to relevant Council working parties.

2 BASIC PRINCIPLES

- 2.1 Providing security and maintaining law and order within the territory of a Member State is a national responsibility and prerogative, which must always be a key consideration for any international co-operation on security at major sporting events.
- 2.2 Although the host Member State has primary responsibility for providing for the security of the 2004 Olympic Games and other comparable international sporting events given their international character, all other Member States and EU competent bodies have a responsibility to assist and support the provision of such security.

3 THREAT ASSESSMENT AND RISK ANALYSIS

- 3.1 An appropriate and timely assessment of the terrorist threats posed to the 2004 Olympic Games or other international sporting event is of central importance in security terms. Alongside the specific assessment of the relevant terrorist threat to the Olympic Games or other comparable major sporting event an analysis covering the collection, evaluation and dissemination of security-relevant information referring to a given specific situation must be made.
- 3.2 For this reason, the responsible organising State, supported where appropriate by other Member States and EU competent bodies, shall draw up an updated threat assessment and risk analysis six months before the relevant event at the latest. This should be updated again one month before the event and, if necessary, on a weekly basis before the event. During the event, daily situation reports should be issued. The aforementioned reports should be based on information provided by the host State, other Member States and EU competent bodies.
- 3.3 Such assessments and analyses should be shared among contributing States and bodies.
- 3.4 Apart from the intelligence available to the organising State itself, information and evaluations provided by other Member States will be the basis for the analysis. The Member States will send it to the organising State as soon as possible by telephonic or other appropriate means using existing secure communication lines.

- 3.5 In order to optimise the timeliness of the analysis, information and evaluations should also be provided in the form of round table enquiries among the liaison officers during the event.
- 3.6 The selection of suitable, necessary and appropriate security measures shall be based on the risk analysis.
- 3.7 The threat assessments and risk analyses will serve as a basis for coordinated public relations work with the press and the media while, at all times, maintaining the confidentiality of information.

4 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

BASIC TASKS

- 4.1 Considering that information is a key instrument in preventing terrorist actions, and that information can be provided prior to, during and after the events, the following tasks are essential:
- information collection;
 - information evaluation; and
 - information dissemination .
- 4.2 In this regard the following information should be prioritised:
- persons involved in terrorist organisations, terrorist actions or other major criminal activities, which might be indirectly related to terrorism;
 - the level of threat against officials (heads of states and governments, members of parliament etc.), athletes, visitors/spectators and venues. In the case of the Olympic Games this will include members of the Olympic Family (IOC and NOC members, sponsors etc. In addition to the host Member State, which has primary responsibility, all other Member States shall independently contribute relevant information in respect to the members of its NOC, as well as on its VIPs who intend to visit the organising country; and

- other information on targets and interests of EU Member States or of third countries in the organising country with a view to their better protection.

BASIC OBLIGATIONS

- 4.3 A Member State should without delay forward information which its national authorities consider to be important for the Olympic Games or other comparable international sporting event in another Member State to its counterpart in the host State. Member States when forwarding information should be conscious of their obligations in terms of its confidentiality.
- 4.4 The exchange of information should be carried out through existing communication channels and structures. The standard forms in the Appendix should be used. The exchange of information, including personal data, should be conducted in strict compliance with national and international law.
- 4.5 The exchange of information should be facilitated by the permanent national contact points of the Member States. After being processed, the collected information as appropriate should be distributed to relevant authorities and services. Contacts between security services, police authorities and other services in different Member States may be coordinated and, if needed, organised by their respective permanent national contact points.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ORGANISING MEMBER STATE

- 4.6 The permanent national contact point in the organising Member State should facilitate the collection, analysis and exchange of relevant information on the event with other Member States, third countries and relevant EU-bodies or other international institutions.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF OTHER MEMBER STATES AND OTHER COMPETENT BODIES

- 4.7 At the earliest possible stage prior to the Olympic Games or other comparable international sporting event each permanent national contact point should provide a risk analysis on individuals or groups expected to travel to the event and deemed to pose a terrorist threat to the event.

The analysis should be forwarded to the organising Member State as well as other affected countries, i.e. transit or neighbouring countries. This analysis can be based on the information contained in the Forms set out in the Appendix. If no such information is available, the organising state should be informed accordingly.

EUROPOL CONTRIBUTION

4.8 The mandate of Europol in accordance with the Europol Convention to draw up general threat assessments on the basis of contributions by Member States should remain unaffected. The threat assessment to be drawn up by Europol shall be incorporated in the initial risk analysis drawn up by the organising State six months prior to the event.

5 PERMANENT CONTACT POINTS

5.1 A permanent contact point should be designated by each Member State.

5.2 Contact details and other relevant information on the permanent contact point should be provided to the organising Member State for distribution to the other Member States. Any relevant changes regarding the permanent contact point of a Member State should be reported in the same way.

TASKS

5.3 The tasks of the permanent national contact points could include assistance in the following activities:

- the collection and analysis of information nationally as well as information from other Member States, third countries, relevant EU bodies and other sources of information,
- the exchange of information through the existing secure communication lines,
- the establishment of reliable and efficient lines of communication to relevant key players nationally and internationally – if necessary using secure lines,
- the exchange of information in cooperation with other Member States, third countries, relevant EU bodies and other international institutions,

- the dissemination of processed information to their respective security services, police authorities and other services, such services of the organising state, as well as authorities and services in other Member States and relevant EU bodies, as appropriate.

MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS

5.4 The permanent national contact point should be able to meet the following standards:

- 24-hour availability (to the necessary extent before, during and after an event),
- staff with sufficient language skills, with knowledge of at least one other EU language,
- permanently operational lines of communication and information structure including phone, fax, e-mail, secured via encryption, and access to the internet,
- sufficient translation capacities for the exchange of information.

6 LIAISON OFFICERS

Appointment

- 6.1 At the request of the organising Member State each Member State or EU competent body may appoint liaison officers for the Olympic Games or other comparable international sporting event, when relevant. A request for liaison officers should be made at the earliest possible stage and, if possible, no later than 8 weeks prior to the event.
- 6.2 Interested Member States may request an invitation to send a liaison officer from the organising Member State.
- 6.3 Liaison officers may be exchanged in accordance with bilateral arrangements between the Host State and other Member State involved.
- 6.4 The liaison officer should be appointed 2 to 4 weeks before the event at which point the cooperation should commence. The organising State should, in close collaboration with the other Member States, decide upon the appointment and tasks of the liaison officers through their respective permanent national contact points.

- 6.5 The liaison officer can be assigned to the host permanent contact point to be in charge of communication with the home State in which case the appropriate means of communication should be provided by the organising Member State.
- 6.6 Liaison officers should play an advisory and assistance role. The foreign liaison officers should be unarmed and have no official authority in the host country. Depending on their specific tasks, liaison officers should have appropriate experience in the field of counter-terrorism and the maintenance of law and order and should have the necessary knowledge and experience, for example:
- a thorough knowledge of their national organisations and authorities;
 - access to all useful information sources in his or her home State;
 - good working knowledge of the working language(s) chosen by the organising Member State; and
 - other specific skills relevant to designated tasks.

ACCREDITATION

- 6.7 Immediately upon arrival in the organising country, officers from other Member States should report their arrival, designated tasks and mandate to the permanent contact point in order to clarify the role of each foreign officer (i.e. liaison officer, operational support, spotters or observers etc.). The organising State as the responsible one will undertake this accreditation process.

7 RESPONSIBILITIES OF INVOLVED AUTHORITIES AND SERVICES IN THE ORGANISING MEMBER STATE

- 7.1 Prior to a relevant event, the organising Member State should ensure that the roles of all involved authorities and services are clearly defined and that their respective responsibilities are communicated to all relevant parties.
- 7.2 In order to ensure that information is disseminated to all key players, the organising State should draw up a comprehensive communication plan visualising the communication lines to all key players.

8 OPERATIONAL MEASURES

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

- 8.1 The competent authorities of the organising Member State should establish a set of plans covering the policy level (*strategic*) as well as the overall operational level (*operational*) and the actual level of deployment at the event (*tactical*). The planning procedure should commence at the earliest possible stage.
- 8.2 The competent authority of the organising Member State should draft an overall operational plan on the basis of which all further detailed plans are made.

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT

- 8.3 The organising Member State may, in accordance with national legislation, request the deployment of police or intelligence officers for operational support from another Member State for the fight against specific terrorist scenarios. A detailed request for operational support, including an account of the reasons for the request, should be made at the earliest possible stage but no later than 4 weeks prior to the event.
- 8.4 Any operational support provided by foreign officers should be included in the operational plans of the competent authorities of the organising State. Accordingly, foreign officers should:
- be included to the fullest possible extent in the operational information structure,
 - be briefed on the operational plans and relevant policies including instructions on the use of force etc. in one of their working languages,
 - be offered the opportunity to acquaint themselves with the venue and deployed police forces etc. prior to the event,
 - attend all relevant briefing sessions (i.e. relevant to their task and in a language they understand),

- where appropriate, be actively included in the police deployment on the ground (i.e. spotting known individuals or groups, mediating with own nationals etc.).

8.5 The organising competent authorities are responsible for the physical security of the foreign officers. It is the responsibility of the foreign officers to ensure that their actions are not causing unnecessary conflict or danger or unjustified risks.

8.6 When deployed on the ground, foreign officers should at all times refer to and be under the supervision of members of the host competent authority that are properly briefed on the operational plan and able to communicate in a language that the foreign officer understands. The communication lines between foreign officers, the host permanent national contact, the management of the deployed police forces and other key players should be efficient and fully functional during an event and, to the necessary extent, also before and after the event.

8.7 The organising Member State may arrange for support from other Member States when possible through bilateral/multilateral agreements on temporary provision of equipment or other resources.

9 MEASURES RELATING TO THE CROSSING OF BORDERS

9.1 Subject to national laws and applicable European legislation,

- (i) Member States should utilise available and appropriate legislative measures to prevent individuals or groups who are considered to pose a terrorist threat to the Olympic Games or other comparable international sporting event from travelling to the location of the event; and
- (ii) the organising Member State and its neighbouring countries may implement a flexible, joint border regime intensifying police efforts in the border regions adapted to the concrete situation or threat. When this is deemed useful and appropriate, common or co-ordinated preventive patrols and controls may be carried out.

The necessary arrangements for a quick and efficient implementation of potential expulsion measures should be made well in advance of the event, including co-operation with other national authorities and other Member States.

10 EVALUATION AND MONITORING

- 10.1 The organising Member State should initiate an evaluation of the security efforts during the Olympic Games or other comparable international sporting event. Major players should all be invited to contribute to the evaluation, which should be based on the prior planning of the event.
- 10.2 As soon as possible after a terrorist incident has occurred, the organising Member State should organise the drafting of an incident report and, subsequently, an evaluation report.
- 10.3 A debriefing should be organised and a written overall evaluation report on relevant aspects of security should be produced after the event; the report should, where possible, be drafted in at least two official languages of the EU.
- 10.4 The report should be distributed through the permanent contact point to interested countries or EU competent bodies in order to ensure that lessons learned or recommendations made are available for future organisers of an event.

11 TRAINING

- 11.1 A high professional level of training of units involved in security at the Olympic Games or other comparable international sporting event can be achieved, *inter alia*, through:
- thorough and timely general as well as scenario-oriented training and preparation at all levels, possibly including experienced officers from other Member States;
 - deployment of observers to events in other Member States that can provide valuable experience to the home State; and
 - participation of key officers in relevant courses under the authority of relevant institutions, e.g. CEPOL .

12 COSTS

12.1 The organising State should normally cover accommodation and subsistence costs of invited foreign officers (liaison officers) travelling to its territory. The home country should normally cover travelling costs. All costs related to observers sent to the organising Member State should also be borne by the sending State.

**STANDARD FORM FOR EXCHANGING INFORMATION REGARDING INDIVIDUALS
POSING A TERRORIST THREAT¹**

Issuing Information Country	
Event	
Date of the event	

Personal details of the subject	Name	
	Surname	
	Date of birth	
	Nationality	
	Passport 's Number	
	Criminal Record	
	Violent acts	
	Transport used	
	Name of the Organisation/ Support Network	
	Physical Features: * Height * Build * Colour of eyes * Scars	
	Observations	
	Others	

PHOTO
Fingerprint

¹ Reminder: the information in this form is confidential and must never be transferred to third parties without permission of the first sending country.

**STANDARD FORM FOR EXCHANGING INFORMATION REGARDING GROUPS
 POSING A TERRORIST THREAT²**

Issuing Information Country	
Event	
Date of the event	

Details of the Group	Name of Group	
	Origin and aim of Group	
	Brief note on previous activities	
	Modus operandii	
	Observations	

² Reminder: the information in this form is confidential and must never be transferred to third parties without permission of the first sending country.