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ANNEX

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FORWARDING NOTE

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Delegations will find attached the "EU Military Rapid Response Concept" being agreed by the EU Military Committee on 22 January 2003.

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EU MILITARY RAPID RESPONSE CONCEPT

References:

- A. Presidency Progress Report to the Helsinki European Council on strengthening the common European Policy on Security and Defence.
- B. 'Food for Thought' on the Elaboration of the Headline Goal presented to Meeting of EU defence Ministers at Sintra, 28 February 2000.
- C. Presidency Report on the European Security and Defence Policy to the Nice European Council (Annex VI to the Presidency Conclusions).
- D. Laeken Mandate for the Spanish Presidency (15193/01).
- E. Workplan for the development of Rapid Response Capabilities (6117/02).
- F. Outcome of Proceedings, EUMC Meeting at the level of CHOD, 28-02-2002 (6668/02).
- G. Outcome of Proceedings, EUMC Meeting at the level of CHOD, 05-06-2002 (9863/02).
- H. European Union Suggestions for procedures for coherent, comprehensive EU crisis management (15841/02).
- I. Helsinki Headline Goal Catalogue (HHC) 2002 (10473/02).
- J. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**
- K. Helsinki Progress Catalogue (HPC) 2001 (12883/01).
- L. European Union Concept for Military Strategic Planning (1046/01)
- M. Framework Nation Concept (11278/02).
- N. General Principles and Procedures for EU Force Identification, Generation/Activation and Deployment (12398/02).
- O. Conclusions GAERC, 19 November 2002 (2464th Council Meeting, External Relations, 14184/02)

A. INTRODUCTION

1. In Helsinki (ref. A), "*Member States have set themselves the Headline Goal: by the year 2003, co-operating together voluntarily, they will be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks¹ as set out in the Amsterdam treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level... Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller Rapid Response elements available and deployable at very high readiness*".
2. EU Defense Ministers stated at Sintra (ref. B) that "*..we should plan to provide a smaller rapid response element of immediate reaction forces at very high readiness, particularly of entry and other enabling forces; the scale and nature of such forces will depend on the particular circumstances of an operation.*"
3. The Laeken Presidency Mandate (ref. D) invited the Spanish Presidency "*to take forward the Helsinki mandate to develop the procedures and concepts required to deploy the Rapid Response elements of the Headline Goal.*" The Spanish Presidency subsequently presented a Workplan (ref. E) **NOT DECLASSIFIED**. The EUMC, in the 6 Feb 2002 meeting, tasked the EUMS in accordance with the Workplan.
4. The EUMC, at the level of CHOD, tasked the EUMS in February 2002 **NOT DECLASSIFIED** (ref. F), a task reaffirmed at the meeting in June 2002.
5. The GAERC in November 2002 (ref. O) "*tasked the PSC and the EUMC to finalise the work on rapid response elements as soon as possible on the basis of the following principles:*
 - reaction within 5 to 30 days or less;
 - streamlining of crisis management procedures according to the operational requirements of rapid response;
 - advance planning based on illustrative scenarios;
 - specific identification of rapid response elements in the Headline Goal Force Catalogue;
 - modalities for the use of the agreed framework nation and other concepts as may be agreed."
6. Furthermore, some Member States including the Presidency, provided valuable National food for thought papers, promoting the discussion on Rapid Response and related issues, which are taken into account in this concept.

B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

7. The purpose of this document is to provide a general conceptual basis for the conduct of EU-led military CMOs requiring a Rapid Response.

¹ In this concept further addressed as TEU, Art 17.2 Tasks.

8. This paper is to be seen as a military document on Rapid Response, defining the notion and describing the main interrelated elements, measures and actions. The document further presents an overview of the Union's main options on how to react on a crisis requiring a Rapid Response.
9. Although the EU will tackle crisis situations with all available instruments, only military factors are considered in this concept. At the same time the document strives to be, as much as possible, consistent with NATO definitions and procedures², while taking into account the characteristics of the EU.

C. EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT

10. In response to crises, the Union's particular strength is its capacity to mobilise a vast range of both civilian and military measures and instruments, thus giving it an overall conflict-prevention and crisis-management capability in support of the objectives of the CFSP. *"In developing this autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises, the EU will be able to carry out the full range of Petersberg tasks as defined in the Treaty on European Union: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking"*. (ref. C)
11. Accordingly, the Headline Goal was defined and a wide range of EU concepts and (crisis management) procedures, as well as various Command and Control options were developed. However, it may be that the circumstances of a crisis require a response within a shorter time limit than the ability *"..to deploy in full within 60 days.."* as mentioned in ref. A. This concept therefore identifies all aspects to be addressed enabling this Rapid (or Immediate) Response.
12. The operations addressed are EU-led CMOs, conducted under political control and strategic direction of the EU. A situation may occur, where one crisis management operation, in a rapid response context, is not led by the EU, but is launched unilaterally and conducted by one or more Member State(s) (EU Member State-led operation). Based on a political decision, taken case-by-case, the EU may wish also to react to that situation³.
13. Rapid Response Options. An overview, summarising all the possibilities, giving the EU a number of options on how to react on crises requiring a Rapid (including Immediate) Response, is depicted in a simplified flowchart in ANNEX A.

² The process of development of a NATO high readiness doctrine, including requirements for HQs, is still ongoing.
³ This response, upon Council decision, could inter alia deal with:

- a. Information & co-ordination/Clearinghouse role. In responding to a crisis the EU can derive benefit in the form of information flow from the involvement of Member States in a particular crisis. This information could be channelled through the EUMC, acting as a clearinghouse.
- b. Supporting role. It might be appropriate for the EU to provide its support to a non EU-led operation. This support could take many forms, drawing on the whole range of instruments available to the EU.
- c. Start of a EU-led Follow on operation. On the basis of the policy adopted by the EU in respect of the crisis, and under the control of the Council and PSC, the EU could consider whether or not to start an EU- led follow-on operation.

D. RAPID RESPONSE: DEFINITIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS

14. Rapid Response. "Rapid Response" is defined as:
The acceleration of the overall approach which encompasses all interrelated measures and actions in the field of decision-making, planning, force identification, generation/activation and deployment, together with the availability of assets and capabilities, and potential C2 options, in order to enable a swift and decisive military reaction to a crisis.
15. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**
16. Rapid Response Elements. Rapid Response Elements within the Headline Goal is defined as: Packages of forces and capabilities, possibly combined and joint, tailored for a specific task, at very high readiness (available and deployable on short notice), either as part of an overall force (for example force enablers) or to conduct an urgent operation of a smaller scale, self contained.
17. Response Time. The overall response time to a crisis can be described as the time from when the EU considers that action is appropriate until the moment that Forces have arrived in the Joint Operations Area (JOA) and are ready for action⁴. It includes the time for decisionmaking, planning, deployment to and in the JOA, but as many specific factors influence each individual crisis and in order to safeguard some flexibility, no fixed timelines should be assigned to this term, even in a situation requiring a "Rapid Response". Suffice to say, it must facilitate the EU in its having a decisive influence in the solution of the crisis at hand.
18. However as stated, ref. A requires for crisis management operations in general, the ability to be deployed in the JOA within 60 days from the Council decision⁵ to launch the operation. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**, an indication of a Rapid Reaction in the case of an EU-led CMO would be the ability to have forces and capabilities deployed in the JOA and are ready for action within approx. 5 to 30 days (depending on the crisis) from the Council decision to launch the operation.

⁴ Based on ref. H (§25) and on parts of the PSC working assumption (COREU 181102).

⁵ However some activities will have started before the EU Council formally decides to launch the operation, as further described in Chapter F.

19. Certain emergencies could necessitate an even faster reaction, an Immediate Reaction. The forces and capabilities required should therefore -again as an indication- have the ability to be deployed in the JOA and ready for action within 5 days from the Council decision to launch the operation in the case of EU-led CMO, requiring a Immediate Response.
20. The Measures & Actions executed from the detection of the crisis until the Council decision to launch the operation are **not** included in the mentioned time periods. Only a condensed execution of these interrelated Measures & Actions, as described in Chapter F, will enable the EU to react in a foreseen way allowing for a Rapid Response. Beside that, all EU developed and agreed concepts and procedures should basically also be used in the case of an EU-led CMO requiring a Rapid Response, but may have to be applied in a more flexible way.
21. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**
22. Readiness is a military tool that enables adequate military planning and preparation in order to achieve a short response time and is linked to forces and units. Readiness should therefore not be confused with Response Time. Readiness is dealt within chapter F.

E. POSSIBLE SITUATIONS REQUIRING A RAPID RESPONSE

23. Pursuant to the TEU, Art 17.2, EU crisis management tasks shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.
24. Ref. I describes three scenarios, illustrative for the whole range of TEU, Art. 17.2 Tasks and the therefore required assets and capabilities:
 - a. Separation of Parties by Force, with the defined variety Steady State;
 - b. Conflict Prevention Operation/Preventive Deployment;
 - c. Assistance to Civilians, with two defined varieties:
 - (1) Humanitarian Operations - Specialised Assistance and Logistical Support Operation with Military Assets providing a secure environment;
 - (2) Evacuation Operation in a potential hostile environment.

From these tasks the following could primarily require a shorter reaction time:


 - Humanitarian Operations;
 - Evacuation Operations.
25. Virtually all operations could have Rapid Response implications, albeit in different forms. EU-led CMOs can be divided into a number of phases that are not clear-cut, will overlap each other, cannot be considered distinct or independent of others, and are specifically tailored to the characteristics of the crisis. In particular, enabling elements may need to be at very high readiness in order to be deployed in the earlier phases of an operation to prepare the ground for the main forces, even when executed in the context of a 'deployment within 60 days'.

26. Immediate Response, to be seen as a subset of Rapid Response, may be required in the case of emergencies. Characteristic tasks are predominantly evacuation operations, and those humanitarian operations requiring the shortest reaction time.
27. Summarising, Rapid Response tasks, being a subset of the Headline Goal, could be required on the one hand as a reaction to a fast arising crisis (as an aim as such), and on the other hand could possibly be part of a larger operation enabling follow-on phases (as a means contributing to achieve the aim).

Immediate Response, being a subdivision of Rapid Response could be required as a reaction to an emergency.

F. ACTIONS & MEASURES ENABLING AN EU RAPID RESPONSE

28. In order to be prepared to conduct EU-led CMOs requiring a Rapid Response, the (mission specific) response time must be reduced as much as possible by optimising each of the following individual measures and/or actions.



29. Crisis Management Procedures. EU-led CMO require a careful balance between the various instruments available to the Union. Current crisis management procedures (ref. H) reflect this necessity and represent a co-ordinated approach taking into account many varying interests.

30. Should circumstances require a Rapid Response, the execution of these procedures should be tailored to the prevailing situation and may have, by necessity, to be undertaken in parallel. Or as ref H. states in its Introduction: **NOT DECLASSIFIED**. The TEU further allows in cases requiring a rapid decision, the convening of the Council at short notice⁶ in order to decide on EU measures and actions to be taken in case of a fast arising crisis.

31. Flexible application of EU crisis management procedures should further be backed up by swift decision-making in Capitals. Furthermore, Member States could, in parallel, optimise national measures in order to reduce response time.

32. Military Strategic Planning. The crisis response military strategic planning process of a specific crisis could be shortened by identifying in advance potential hot spots through early warning and information-provision by Member States and/or other sources, in order to determine the EU's likely involvement and, facilitate, predefining illustrative Rapid Response scenarios and conducting advance planning⁷.

⁶ TEU Art 22.2: "...within forty-eight hours or, in an emergency, within a shorter period..".

⁷ I.a.w. Ref M.

33. Based on endorsed accomplished military strategic advance planning, the planning process in response to a potential crisis could further be shortened by using potential OHQs to develop contingency plans.
34. Planning preparations for certain emergency scenarios would be enhanced if National contingency plans including the anticipated resource requirements, could be made available by Member States. In these situations, the EUMC could assume a clearinghouse role in order to have all Member States informed about respective National plans.
35. Operational Planning. The operational planning process in response to a specific crisis can be shortened by the offer and designation of the OpCdr and his OHQ as early as possible, after detection of the crisis. This is a vital precondition when Rapid Response is required.
36. Force Identification, Generation/Activation and Deployment. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

37. Preparations. Further preparations towards a Rapid Response operation could be accelerated, by pre-arranging practical modalities for multinationalisation, the mounting and the deployment of HQs and forces. Moreover, all necessary administrative, logistic and financial measures should be prepared in order to ensure their rapid implementation, when urgency is required.
38. EU Rapid Response awareness. In addition to all mentioned measures and actions promoting a shorter reaction time, EU political and military bodies should, by routine, get themselves ready for a swift and decisive reaction. This could be achieved by step by step preparations, closely monitoring the increasing tensions and intensifying the exchange of information between Member States during the build up of a random crisis.

Thus, the Union would be capable of conducting EU-led CMOs requiring a Rapid Response, even when not anticipated in advance.


G. COMMAND OPTIONS

39. If the EU conducts EU-led CMO requiring a Rapid Response, two basic Command Options exist:

Command Options for EU Crisis Management Operations

- a. Either **with** recourse to NATO common assets & capabilities. NATO has the ability to provide the full range of Command and Control assets and capabilities to cover the needs for an EU-led operation in the framework of TEU, Art 17.2 Missions.

EU-led



- b. Or **without** recourse to NATO common assets & capabilities. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

40. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

41. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

H. ASSETS & CAPABILITIES

42. Identification of Headline Goal Capabilities. To identify the Member State capabilities required for the overall Headline Goal a structured force development process had to be followed.

43. In order to define the capabilities required to deliver the Headline Goal listed in the Helsinki Headline Goal Catalogue (HHC, ref I), the Member States agreed on a force development process following a six-step approach:
- **Step 1:** The use of an agreed strategic context, including a level of ambition;
 - **Step 2:** The use of agreed key planning assumptions;
 - **Step 3:** The development of appropriate planning scenarios;
 - **Step 4:** The use of a “generic List of Capabilities” required to support planning scenarios;
 - **Step 5:** The examination of the illustrative scenarios and application of the key planning assumptions by military experts, who derived the required capabilities and developed ORBATS capable of delivering the identified capability requirements; and
 - **Step 6:** The definition of the Total Force Requirement using force packages appropriate to each scenario.

44. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

45. Currently, the HHC contains planning assumptions that don't reflect exactly the definitions and characteristics of this concept. In order to elaborate the requirements leading to an EU Rapid Response capability, the development process should be adapted, taking into account additional planning assumptions specific to the Rapid Response Elements, such as the deployment time of the Force.

NOT DECLASSIFIED


46. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

47. **NOT DECLASSIFIED**

48. In particular any EU Member State assets and capabilities that are already deployed close to the crisis JOA could greatly enhance a rapid response, such as for example forces conducting exercises or stationed in the region.”

49. Non-Member States Assets and Capabilities. The EU, potentially, also has recourse to additional assets and capabilities, should they be offered and the EU Council decides to call upon them:
- NATO assets and capabilities
 - **NOT DECLASSIFIED**
 - "Third Countries".

ANNEX A RAPID RESPONSE OPTIONS



1. Generally with recourse to a Framework Nation which could be particularly envisaged in operations in which an important criterion is urgency