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NOTE

From:	European Union Military Committee
To:	Political and Security Committee
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Subject:	EU Military Rapid Response Concept

Delegations will find attached the EU Military Rapid Response Concept, which was agreed by the EUMC on 21 January 2009.

The PSC will be invited to take note of this document on 30 April. 2009.

EUROPEAN UNION

MILITARY RAPID RESPONSE

CONCEPT

EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY RAPID RESPONSE CONCEPT

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- L. EU Concept for Military Command and Control (10688/08, dated 16 June 2008).
- M. EU Concept for Force Generation (10690/08, dated 16 June 2008).
- N. Requirements Catalogue (RC 05) (13732/05, dated 7 November 2005).
- O. European Security Strategy (15895/03, dated 8 December 2003).
- P. EU Concept for Military Intelligence Structures in EU Crisis Management and EU-led military operations (10990/08, dated 19 June 2008).
- Q. EU Concept for Logistic Support for EU-led Military Operations (10963/08, dated 19 June 2008).
- R. Host Nation Support (HNS) Concept for EU-led Military Crisis Management Operations, Revision 1 (10603/06, dated 15 June 2006).
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- U. Military Engineering Concept for EU-led Military Crisis Management Operations (11853/07, dated 13 July 2007).

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- W. EU Concept for CIS for EU-led Military Operations (11702/08, dated 10 July 2008).

A. INTRODUCTION

1. The EU has a range of crisis management instruments at its disposal. These include civilian activities, such as political, diplomatic, economic, humanitarian and military activities.
2. The ability for the EU to conduct civil missions and military operations has developed over time. The Helsinki Headline Goal 2003 (Ref. A) established the military requirement for crisis management operations the ability to deploy within 60 days from the EU Council decision to launch the military operation. Specifically, the EU should be able to deploy a Corps Size Force (50-60,000 troops) within 60 days and also smaller elements with a faster response.
3. The requirement for smaller, faster response elements has been refined and is now known as Rapid Response. This paper addresses the EU crisis management instrument of Military Rapid Response.
4. Member States (MS) further committed themselves in the Headline Goal 2010 (Ref. B) to be able to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach across the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (Ref. C). This now is the mandate for the further development of a Military Rapid Response capability.

5. Within the MRRC, of 2003 (Ref. D), it was intended that the overall time, from the Council decision to launch an operation, until operations commence in the Joint Operations Area (JOA), should not exceed 30 days. The Headline Goal 2010, reinforced by the GAERC conclusions of 23 May 2005 (Ref. E), defines the ambition for the EU to be able to take the decision to launch an operation within 5 days of the approval of the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) by the Council. The ambition in terms of deployment is that the forces should start implementing their mission¹ on the ground no later than 10 days after the EU decision to launch the operation. These much shorter timelines for particular cases of Military Rapid Response, especially the shorter deployment timeline which applies to the EU Battle Group, provide the most demanding scenario of Rapid Response. This ambition was translated into the EU Battlegroup Concept (EU BGC) (Ref. F) as a specific form of Military Rapid Response. All types of Military Rapid Response will be considered in this concept.
6. The EU BGC subsequently has been complemented by the Maritime Rapid Response Concept (MarRRC) (Ref. G) and the Air Rapid Response Concept (AirRRC) (Ref. H). Together these three subordinate concepts have generated a range of requirements and principles that have informed this review of the EU Military Rapid Response Concept (MRRC), mandated at Ref. I. The requirement for a Land Rapid Response Concept has yet to be defined.
7. To achieve an overall EU Rapid Response both the political reaction and a possible response by the military needs to be fast and effective. While this paper addresses the Military Response it also identifies where preparation and planning can contribute to reducing the political reaction time.

B. AIM

8. To provide the conceptual framework both for the conduct of EU-led military operations requiring a Rapid Response and the development of land, maritime and air capabilities to meet this requirement.

¹ Current ESDP terminology uses *mission* as a generic term to cover both civilian missions and military operations. The term *operation* is the correct EU term for military activity and will be used throughout in the Military Rapid Response Concept.

C. SCOPE

9. This document describes the EU's approach to Military Rapid Response. It considers military response in all three environments; maritime, land and air in general terms, and also how a Joint² Military Rapid Response could be delivered.
10. It will define Military Rapid Response, its nature, characteristics, principles and procedures. This will be compared with the standard EU Military Response and its relationship to other EU instruments and the Crisis Management Procedures (CMP) (Ref. J).
11. It will establish the framework within which subordinate Military Rapid Response concepts sit. It will also explain the relationship to three principal EU military concepts: EU Concept for Military Planning at the Political and Strategic level (Ref. K), EU Concept for Military Command and Control (Ref. L), and EU Concept for Force Generation (Ref. M).
12. Although the EU will tackle crisis situations with all available instruments in a Comprehensive Approach, only the military instruments and associated factors are considered in this concept. Whilst taking into account the characteristics of the EU, to ensure interoperability, the document aims to be consistent with NATO definitions and procedures.

D. DEFINITIONS - RESPONSE

13. Standard Military Response. The Helsinki Headline Goal 2003 (Ref. A) established the military requirement to be able to deploy up to a Corps Size Force (50-60,000 troops) within 60 days. This ability to be able to deploy at large scale within 60 days is now considered as a standard Military Response.
14. Rapid Response. Rapid Response is a process that delivers the required effects, in a particular crisis, quicker than a standard response.

² Activities, operations and organisations in which elements of at least two (military) Services participate.

15. Military Rapid Response. Military Rapid Response is the acceleration of the overall approach which encompasses all interrelated measures and actions in the field of Intelligence collection, decision-making, planning, force generation and deployment, together with the availability of assets and capabilities, and potential Command and Control (C2) options, in order to enable a swift and decisive military response to a crisis.

E. DEFINITIONS - TIME

16. Overall EU Response Time. The Overall EU Response Time to a crisis encompasses political reaction time and response time (the latter could be civilian, military or both).
17. Political Reaction Time. Political Reaction Time is the period between a crisis being identified and when the Council makes the decision to launch an operation. To support a political decision, civil and military advance planning will have started prior to EU action being considered appropriate.
18. Standard Military Response Time. The time for a standard Military Response is measured from when the Council makes the decision to launch the operation to when operations commence³ in the JOA. A standard Military Response is a period of up to 60 days (see figure 1).
19. Military Rapid Response Time. The time for a Military Rapid Response is measured from when the CMC is approved to when operations commence in the JOA. The timing points for a Military Rapid Response are different from those for a standard Military Response. A Military Rapid Response is a period from 5 to 30 days (see figure 1). In emergency situations, it may be necessary to respond in less than 5 days. This would require an extremely compressed decision making process, finalising all phases of Crisis Response Planning in a very short period of time. It would also require the use of forces which are already held at very high readiness, for national reasons, by MS and are made available for a specific case.

³ This is operation and Service (whether Maritime, Land or Air) dependant. In essence it is when the desired effects start to occur in the JOA.

20. Readiness. Readiness is a military state that allows for adequate military planning and preparation in order to achieve the required response time for forces and units. The readiness of an HQ or a unit is the period of time measured from an initiation order to the moment when an HQ or unit is ready, either to perform its task from its peacetime location (permanent or forward deployed), or to be deployed. This does not include the time to move to and within the JOA (transit time), nor the time to be ready to perform its mission once deployed.

F. FURTHER CRITERIA

21. Headline Goal 2010 Timeline. In the Headline Goal 2010, MS agreed on a more challenging timeline, primarily for EU Battlegroups;

On decision making, the ambition of the EU is to be able to take the decision to launch an operation within 5 days of the approval of the Crisis Management Concept by the Council. On the deployment of forces, the ambition is that the forces start implementing their mission on the ground, no later than 10 days after the EU decision to launch the operation.

22. 23 May 2005 GAERC conclusions. Further to the Headline Goal 2010 timeline the GAERC agreed on 23 May 2005 (Ref.E) that the;

MRRC will ensure that the EU decision-making and planning process can be completed in five days, from approval of the Crisis Management Concept by the Council to the decision to launch an operation, in particular for operations involving Battlegroups.

23. The Headline Goal 2010 timeline and the 23 May 2005 GAERC conclusions make for a significant challenge even when only applied to the specific case of the EU Battlegroup. If the Council demands a planning period of 5 days for operations, other than those utilising the EU BG, then it is more challenging still.

24. Readiness States. Readiness states of forces offered for Military Rapid Response have an effect on their potential employment;
- a. Military Rapid Response forces held at a readiness of 5 to 30 days can respond within the 30 day period of a Military Rapid Response. Military Rapid Response forces offered for the EU BG need to be at a readiness of 5 days to meet the Headline Goal 2010 timeline and the 23 May 2005 GAERC conclusions. These criteria are planning considerations applicable to the forces put at the disposal of the EU by MS.
 - b. It would be desirable for MS to know that their forces, offered at a particular readiness, are eligible for a particular military response. However, military planners have to consider the forces, and their readiness, that are likely to be offered for a particular operation in Advance Planning and subsequently in Crisis Response Planning. Unless the planning, deployment timelines and sequencing for operations using those forces are pre-agreed (such as in the case of the EU BG) then such an indication, due to differences in the desired order of arrival in theatre of forces and capabilities, cannot be given.
 - c. Forces and OHQs offered at high readiness are more likely to be used in Military Rapid Response operations than those required for standard Military Response. For operations using forces which are not pre-agreed (e.g. all Military Rapid Response except those using the EU BG) it remains a national decision which forces and at what readiness they might be offered to the EU for Military Rapid Response.

G. POSSIBLE CRISIS SITUATIONS REQUIRING A MILITARY RAPID RESPONSE

25. The EU has identified 5 illustrative scenarios from the Requirements Catalogue 05 (RC 05) (Ref. N) where it may consider using military means to address a crisis:
- a. Separation of Parties by Force (SOPF);
 - b. Stabilisation, Reconstruction and Military advice to third countries (SR);
 - c. Conflict Prevention (CP);
 - d. Evacuation Operations (EO);
 - e. Assistance to Humanitarian Operations (HA).

26. These illustrative scenarios identify the types of crisis situations that the EU may wish to address using military means. Although all could be tackled by a Military Rapid Response, some are more likely than others.
27. Typically the first three (SOPF, SR & CP) types of crisis situation may require a more robust and sustainable force to reach the desired objectives rather than a Military Rapid Response. However, a Military Rapid Response could still be considered during Advance Planning. The latter two (EO & HA) crisis situations are more likely to require a Military Rapid Response. e.g. Evacuation Operations could be in a permissive or non-permissive environment. Assistance to Humanitarian Operations could include prevention of atrocities or consequence management of man-made or natural disasters.
28. In addition the EU may tackle SOPF and CP types of crisis situations with a Military Rapid Response. This may be as an initial entry force to enable a follow-on force.
29. The European Security Strategy (ESS) (Ref. O) includes situations not considered in the RC 05 scenarios: Terrorism, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Organised Crime. Military response is unlikely to be required for these types of crisis situations. However, military assets may be used in support of the civil authorities for ESS situations. Such involvement is not considered further in this concept.

H. PRINCIPLES FOR A MILITARY RAPID RESPONSE

30. Speed. There is the need to generate suitable and available forces, equipment and C2 structures quickly to enable a Military Rapid Response. The mechanism to generate forces quickly is a primary requirement for Military Rapid Response. Without it, the time needed for planning, organisation and preparation could exceed the time available.
31. Scale. Military Rapid Response Forces' operational advantage is their increased agility but they might face a calculated risk, in combat engagement and sustainability, in comparison to those forces employed in a standard Military Response. Although force protection and logistics will be tailored accordingly there may be associated risks in conducting a Military Rapid Response and consequently on how the force can be employed.

32. Concurrency. Planning and Force Generation of available and suitable forces must be conducted concurrently if a Military Rapid Response is to be achieved. This is greatly assisted by as much Advance Planning and advanced Force Packaging as possible.
33. Synergy. Synergy must be achieved; within force packages (especially if multinational), within a Joint force (if used) and across the C2 structure and force as a whole. Therefore integration, coordination and cooperation within force packaging is essential. The synergy of all of these areas is aided by interoperability.
34. Rehearsals and practice. Operation rehearsals and practice are required by Military Rapid Response Forces once tasks have been identified. Where this is not possible other measures, such as a coordination conference, should be conducted to mitigate this situation.
35. Availability. MS are likely to offer such Military Rapid Response forces by means of a pre-agreed roster (as in the case in the EU BGC), Force Generation mechanisms (such as employed in the Maritime and Air Rapid Response Concepts) or use of a Force Catalogue. This is necessary to ensure that availability can be maintained over time. Whatever technique is used to inform advance planning, the information on force availability must be realistic to avoid wasted effort and delays.
36. Readiness Matching. The readiness of military units must match the timings of the political decision making process, in particular those designated for specific cases of Military Rapid Response such as the EU BG. The readiness and early availability of the supporting elements in such cases, e.g. logistics or air and sea lift assets, must also match. Without appropriate readiness, forces may not be available, in the right sequence, at the right time. Until forces are assigned to the OpCdr, changes in their readiness to meet the timeline for an operation remain a national responsibility.

37. Intelligence Support. Intelligence support is conducted in accordance with the EU Concept for Military Intelligence Structures in EU Crisis Management and EU-led military operations (Ref. P). Intelligence support has to provide an analysis of the current situation, consider potential and emerging issues and include an evaluation of their possible development. A Military Rapid Response operation may be confronted with a particularly fluid operational environment. The time needed for a comprehensive Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) to identify the potential risks will probably be far too short. As a consequence, depending on the character of the mission, the deployed forces must have integral intelligence elements (SIGINT, HUMINT, etc) and appropriate analytical capabilities to provide Intelligence support locally. Reach-back capabilities will provide crucial support in particular during the initial phase of the operation until integral Intelligence support is fully established.
38. Logistic Support and Health and Medical Support. Logistic support is conducted in accordance with the EU Concept for Logistic Support for EU-led Military Operations (Ref. Q) and other subordinate and related EU logistic Concepts (Host Nation Support (HNS) (Ref. R), Strategic Movement and Transportation (M&T) (Ref. S), Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOM&I) (Ref. T) and Engineering (Ref. U)). Health and Medical Support is conducted in accordance with the Health and Medical support Concept for Military EU-led Crisis Management Operations (Ref. V).
- a. The availability and readiness levels of logistic and medical units and resources must match the readiness state of forces allocated to Military Rapid Response formations (as discussed in readiness matching previously). A Military Rapid Response force must be initially self-sustaining. Consequently, logistic and medical resources assigned to a Military Rapid Response force should be sufficient to achieve the designated levels of autonomy and sustainability, and the same degree of mobility, of the force to provide the required logistic and medical capability necessary for a Military Rapid Response operation. It will then rely on logistic and medical support from MS.

- b. Although logistic and medical support of forces is normally a MS responsibility, pre-planned multinational logistics, including the use of contractors and medical arrangements, may provide the most efficient response in EU-led military operations. These capabilities are developed, negotiated and agreed during Advance Planning, finalised in Crisis Management Planning, and implemented in advance of deployment for operations.
 - c. Logistic resupply and medical support for Military Rapid Response forces should be defined and agreed before a crisis. This should either be conceptually (as in the EU BG) or as part of multinational logistic and medical arrangements described above. Hence, military logisticians and medical planners need to be involved from the very beginning of the planning process for Military Rapid Response operations; at the Advance Planning stage. Logistics may influence the selection of the Course of Action (COA), the approach and the rate at which it can be achieved.
 - d. If logistic resupply and medical support for Military Rapid Response forces are not defined and agreed before a crisis then logistic and medical arrangements must be declared as MS assign forces for a particular operation. This will invariably have a negative impact on the ability to launch a Military Rapid Response operation.
39. Joint Rapid Response. A Joint approach may produce a more effective force, than a single Service option. However, its deployment, integration and utilisation may be more complex and affect the Military Response Time. There are circumstances where this is not necessarily the case, particularly when a small to medium two Service option is envisaged (e.g. a 'land heavy' operation supported by limited air assets). A Joint Force, rapidly assembled and deployed, may further multiply the complexities and challenges of a Combined multinational force.

40. Military Rapid Response Forces Employment. Military Rapid Response Forces may be used in a standalone operation, typically with an identified end state and/or end date. It is possible to use the rapid effect of a Military Rapid Response (such as the EU BG) as a precursor to a more deliberate, larger operation (a standard Military Response) which may require the full period of 60 days for planning and force generation. In this case, the planning and generation of the follow-on forces should be concurrent with the initial Military Rapid Response as the endurance of the Military Rapid Response forces may be limited.
41. Range of capabilities. The expectation may be for EU Military Rapid Response forces to be used in crises that more often require peacekeeping rather than warfighting skills. Whilst this may prove to be true in practice the EU must have the ability to call upon warfighting skills. So, any forces assigned to Military Rapid Response operations must be able to deliver the full range of capabilities required to address crisis situations that require an EU Rapid Response.

I. CHARACTERISTICS AND RISKS

42. Military Rapid Response forces are liable to face different military risks than a force generated and deployed as a standard military response. Considerations and factors that contribute to the risk,⁴ to Rapid Response forces are; preparation, sustainability, incomplete intelligence picture (Ref. P), force protection, vulnerability of CIS infrastructure (Ref. W), logistics (Ref. Q), health and medical (Ref. V) and other support. The planning for an operation should match the capabilities of the force to the expected level of risk. The risk factors for each operation should be quantified in the military advice provided by the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) to the Political and Security Committee (PSC). The risk of an operation can be assessed and briefed at any stage in the Crisis Management Procedures (CMP).
43. Identification of available strategic lift assets is an essential precursor to the Force Generation process. Force Generation must quickly identify strategic lift capacities so that feasibility of a Military Rapid Response can be assessed.

⁴ The risk includes the risk to own forces (a force protection issue) and risk of operation success.

44. Where the EU has decided that a Military Rapid Response is appropriate, the timeliness of the response is a combination of the readiness of the forces, the willingness of the MS to commit forces plus Force Generation or balancing required to ensure a full, coherent and capable force. This is concurrent with, and derived from, the operational requirements out of Advance Planning and Crisis Response Planning. These must include preplanning of deployment options to ensure the timeliness of response.
45. Additional concurrent preparation will include the integration of the force, its structure and task grouping as tasks emerge from the planning process. The sequence of the operation will also determine the order in which tasks, especially preliminary or enabling tasks, must be undertaken and the desired order of arrival of forces. At the same time, the dynamics of the parallel planning process require continuous communication and explanation, while the events of the crisis unfold. This is a period of high activity and preparation.
46. Once the commitment to deploy is made, the time taken to arrive, and be ready in the JOA is determined by the nature and scale of the force plus the strategic lift made available by MS and the distance to the JOA. The role of MS as enablers and the provision of logistics and medical support will also contribute to how well prepared the Force is on arrival. The readiness of the assigned forces and the flexibility to cope with changes in circumstances and the unforeseen will depend upon the depth and quality of planning and the preparation, both doctrinal and operational.

J. MILITARY RAPID RESPONSE IN EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT

47. The military contribution to the EU CMP is described in the EU Concept for Military Planning at the Political and Strategic Level (Ref. K).
48. The EU will conduct Advance Planning before deciding that action is appropriate and before responding to any crisis. The EU's Comprehensive Approach includes planning across the range of instruments by consultation, cooperation and collaboration within Council bodies, EU institutions, Member States and external organisations.

49. Military Advance Planning (at the Political and Strategic level and also the Military Strategic level) together with the planning conducted across the range of EU instruments allows a decision on whether a military response is appropriate or not.
50. When the decision that EU Action is Appropriate is taken, a firm indication of whether a standard Military Response or a Military Rapid Response is to be used will greatly assist EUMS planners and also MS to decide on their force contributions.
51. If a Military Rapid Response option is proposed then military advice on the CMC, through the EUMC, will include consideration on whether it is appropriate and achievable.
52. Military Rapid Response time can be reduced by drawing on military forces offered by the MS, held at appropriate readiness, suitably configured for Rapid Response and provided with adequate strategic lift. Similarly the timely designation of the Operation Commander (OpCdr) and the Force Commander (FCdr), the early identification and activation of the Operation Headquarters (OHQ) and the Force Headquarters (FHQ), as well as the identification of possible force packages will facilitate the Force Generation process, the force balancing and a quicker response.
53. Specific force readiness required to achieve a Military Rapid Response is described in; the EU Battlegroup Concept (Ref. F), the EU Maritime Rapid Response Concept (Ref. G), and the EU Air Rapid Response Concept (Ref. H). The availability of forces offered by MS, at the correct readiness, will dictate whether a Military Rapid Response is possible.

54. The identification of a possible C2 structure and the activation of an OHQ should be aimed for as early as possible, ideally in conjunction with the approval of the CMC⁵. This will ensure that the EU decision making and planning process can be supported and completed within 5 days. In other cases proactive dialogue between EUMS and MS and other military planners and the Force Generation mechanisms should be used to achieve a similar effect and thereby identify the likeliest OHQs for a potential operation. The final selection of the required OHQ for a specific operation, amongst others, should be based on a number of critical/important factors such as the scale and the nature of the operation, geography (area of operation/location of the OHQ), previous involvement of an OHQ, any other political sensitivities.
55. Figure 1 shows a timeline of the major milestones of the EU CMP and the military response to a crisis whether standard or rapid. The timing points for a standard Military Response and a Military Rapid Response are different; the start point for a standard Military Response is the Council's decision to launch and for a Military Rapid Response it is the approval of the CMC.
56. The period allocated for planning and decision making in Military Rapid Response (i.e the time between the approval of the CMC and the Council taking the decision to launch the operation) is not fixed. However, it is within the Council's prerogative to call for planning and decision making for an operation to be completed within five days. This will be particularly challenging and means that Advance Planning, Crisis Response Planning, C2 arrangements and Force Generation are complete before the Council decision to launch. Similarly a protracted period of planning would cause problems for subsequent lower level planning and a timely deployment.
57. The Headline Goal 2010 response timeline is achievable in cases where MS have agreed measures that identify forces and preferred OHQs in advance and have completed a significant amount of planning (e.g. EU BG). The timescale of 5 days for planning and 10 days for deployment is shown at Figure 1.

⁵ In the absence of a Joint Action this can be achieved by a Council decision (recorded in Council Conclusions).

58. However, if forces and OHQs are not pre-identified and planning is not completed prior to the approval of the CMC, the Headline Goal 2010 timeline can not be achieved. Subject to Force Generation MS will have to accept a more generic Military Rapid Response time of up to 30 days.
59. During Military Rapid Response, prior to operations commencing in the JOA, the Military Forces are in one of three phases; Readiness, Preparation and Deployment. Figure 1 shows military input to planning during the readiness phase which comprises Advance Planning and then Crisis Response Planning.
- a. During the Preparation phase Crisis Response Planning continues at the Political and Strategic level. Planning at the Military Strategic level continues under the OpCdr when appointed and the OHQ is designated and manned. As the FCdr is appointed and the FHQ is designated and manned Operational level planning continues. Planning continues, in parallel, at appropriate levels, throughout the Preparation and Deployment phases (see figure 1).
 - b. Crisis Response Planning starts as soon as an emerging crisis is identified by the EU at the political level. In the Readiness phase it leads to the development of a CMC (as previously mentioned). In the Preparation phase Crisis Response Planning facilitates the production of Military Strategic Options (MSO) and an Initiating Military Directive (IMD).
 - c. Due to the Military Rapid Response timelines the OpCdr may have to develop a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and an Operation Plan (OPLAN). Also during the Deployment phase forces and capabilities are moved to theatre so that operations can commence in the JOA. During this dynamic period of activity, time is at a premium and must be carefully apportioned to each critical element; planning, preparation and movement. It is essential that sufficient time is allowed for subordinate levels of planning to be conducted.

- d. More detail on Crisis Response Planning during the Preparation and Deployment phase is contained in the EU Concept for Military Planning at the Political and Strategic level (Ref. K) and the Crisis Management Procedures (CMP) (Ref. J).
60. Finally, in the use of Military Rapid Response in EU Crisis Management, it is clear that all possible military planning, anticipation and preparation should be completed in advance of political considerations and decisions being made. Then, once the political decision is made to launch a Military Rapid Response operation the forces allocated to the EU will be able to respond within the required time scale.




Figure 1: Military Rapid Response at the Political and Strategic level

K. MILITARY PLANNING

61. Advance Planning is conducted by military and civilian planners to inform the political decision making process, before and after the EU considers that action is appropriate in a crisis.
62. Some types of situations that may require a Military Rapid Response can be identified in advance and planned for. This Advance Planning can transition from generic plans to detailed contingency plans that will have identified the factors, forces and likely C2 options required to address a particular crisis. This work is underpinned by military assessment and analysis conducted by the EUMS, which will inform the Council and MS of military options and the capabilities that could be made available. Advance Planning is therefore essential to reduce the EU's response time. Notwithstanding the tight timelines of Military Rapid Response the speed must be compatible with the integrity military planning for each particular operation.
63. Part of the engagement by MS in Advance Planning is an indication whether the EU's response to a crisis is likely to be a Military Rapid Response or not. This adds clarity and impetus to the subsequent Crisis Response Planning. It also allows the MS likely to contribute forces, to make informed decisions on their forces' readiness states.
64. Identification of the end state or end date is an important part of military planning. This should lead on to the consideration of the transition (to the end of the operation) and potential follow-on forces. The options for the transition are to: stay in place, be replaced totally or partially or to be integrated into a EU follow-on force, or for national elements of the EU force to be part of a wider international effort: such as the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), Coalition or national. This may also change the mission: Different military mission, a civilian, police or a rule of law mission. Transition may require the provision of specialist advisers and liaison officers for both the OHQ and particularly the FHQ, which may require reinforcement, to maintain momentum and continuity.

L. COMMAND AND CONTROL

65. Command and Control arrangements for EU-led military operations are described in the EU Concept for Military Command and Control (Ref. L). The early availability and activation of the C2 structure is essential to Military Rapid Response.
66. The C2 for Military Rapid Response may involve the compression of the chain of the command; more than one level of military command may be conducted by a specific commander (e.g. the functions of FCdr and Component Commander (CC) may be combined).
67. Advance Planning will consider what are the optimal C2 arrangements for a Military Rapid Response operation; the five OHQs offered by MS (of which some may be preferred OHQs for EU BGs on standby or OHQs that have already been activated for another operation), the establishment of an EU OHQ at SHAPE (under the Berlin Plus arrangements), the EU Operations Centre and any national Operations Centres that might be offered by MS for a particular operation will all be considered. Where time is short, the FHQ options may also have to be considered, even before an OpCdr is appointed, to avoid delays in planning.
68. If a transition to follow-on forces is likely then the C2 arrangements to accommodate this will be considered, as will the FHQ's ability to run a Joint, Combined or civil-military operation during and after the transition.

M. FORCE GENERATION

69. Force Generation for EU-led military operations is described in the EU Concept for Force Generation (Ref. M). EUMS planners and MS will have to strive to ensure that Force Generation for Military Rapid Response takes place quickly to achieve the required response time. The availability of forces, equipment and C2 from MS, and their readiness, together with the availability of Strategic Lift will be the dominant factors in determining the likely structure of the military force for a Military Rapid Response. In particular the early availability and suitability of a potential OHQ/FHQ and their staff and an OpCdr and FCdr will be key factors.

70. In the EU BGC, forces are already pre-identified and held on stand-by whereas in an EU Maritime or Air Rapid Response the national offers in the EU Force Catalogue are refined using Maritime and Air Rapid Response information conferences and databases.
71. The early identification of critical assets or shortfalls in the force package is essential. Force balancing should alleviate any weakness or gaps that would compound the risks associated with a faster deployment. In practice in Military Rapid Response it means that indicative forces for an operation are known prior to the production and agreement of the CMC.
72. In the absence of further specific Force Generation mechanisms for Military Rapid Response the onus is on a proactive dialogue between military planners of the EUMS, NATO and MS to identify the best suited OHQ (including establishing an EU OHQ at SHAPE, under the Berlin plus arrangements), FHQ and forces for a potential operation. It is in this dialogue, based on transparent information provided by MS and on accurate information with regard to available NATO assets and capabilities under the Berlin plus arrangements, that valuable planning time can be lost or saved. Finally MS, NATO when appropriate, and other troop contributors should confirm the level and quality of their contributions at the Force Generation Conferences (Ref. J, para 67).
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