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From : European External Action Service
To : Political and Security Committee
Subject : Actions to enhance EU CSDP support to UN peacekeeping

Delegations will find attached the EEAS document ARES (2011) 1375846 on "Actions to enhance EU CSDP support to UN peacekeeping".

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# Actions to Enhance EU CSDP Support to UN Peacekeeping

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**ACTIONS TO ENHANCE EU CSDP SUPPORT TO UN PEACEKEEPING**

*Introduction*

Supporting effective multilateralism and contributing to UN efforts in peacekeeping have been, since the inception of CSDP, at the forefront of EU engagement in the field of crisis management. This principle has translated into concrete action in a number of theatres, such as DRC, Somalia and Afghanistan. EU-UN cooperation in crisis management has manifested itself in a number of ways: the UN taking over from an EU operation (EUFOR Tchad/ RCA), the deployment of EULEX Kosovo after the reconfiguration of UNMIK, EU support to the UN with an EU mission/ operation under EU flag (Artemis, EUFOR RD Congo), as well as a number of other experiences.

In order further to enhance EU CSDP support to UN peacekeeping, on 25 May 2011 the PSC tasked the CMPD to discuss with DPKO and other UN departments as appropriate possibilities for enhancing EU support to UN peacekeeping, and to report back. The present paper forms the reply to that tasking. It also reflects inputs and comments from CPCC, EUMS as well as the UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Field Support (DFS).

*Aim*

The aim of this paper is to present, in accordance with the above PSC tasking, a consolidated list of possible actions in a number of fields in which CSDP could support UN peacekeeping. Implementation of those actions will be dealt with following PSC approval.

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1 The PSC took note of the EUMC advice, the PMG recommendations and the CIVCOM paper that have been produced pursuant the 11 February PSC tasking following discussion on the CMPD paper on Enhancing EU CSDP Support to UN Peacekeeping Operations (doc. 5724/11). The PSC tasked the CMPD, supported by the EUMS and CPCC, to discuss with DPKO and other departments as appropriate possibilities for enhancing EU support to UN peacekeeping, on the basis of the aforementioned documents, and to report back to the PSC early in the third quarter of 2011.
**Principles guiding EU CSDP support to UN peacekeeping**

A number of guiding principles were proposed in the previous EEAS papers presented to the PSC. Following discussions with DPKO and DFS, it is proposed to retain the following principles to guide our consideration of future EU CSDP actions to support UN peacekeeping.

a) **Added value and mutual advantage** - EU CSDP engagement in support of UN peacekeeping should add value and produce real operational benefits on the ground. It should be based on the principle of comparative advantage, leading to a complementarity of efforts and elimination of duplication and competition. It should bring advantages to both organizations.

b) **Political control and strategic direction** - For a given UN or EU operation, from a political to tactical level, there should be only one body providing political control and exercising strategic direction.

c) **Unity of the chain of command** - For a given UN or EU operation, there should be only one operational commander in charge of the operation.

d) **National ownership of decision to allocate resources** - EU CSDP support to UN peacekeeping does not hamper the UN’s ability to reach out to its Member States directly, nor to receive assistance from EU Member States on a bilateral basis.

e) **Lessons Learned** - Further work on enhancing EU CSDP support to UN peacekeeping operations should be based on relevant lessons learned from previous experiences.

f) **Consistency with UN reform** - Cooperation should be in line with existing peacekeeping reform efforts endorsed by the Member States. This includes the various elements of the New Horizons initiative, including the capability-driven approach and the Global Field Support Strategy.

g) **Increasing EU Member States Direct Contributions** – An important purpose of our cooperation should be to increase direct contributions by EU Member States to peacekeeping operations, in particular as Police Contributing Countries (PCC) or Troop Contributing Countries (TCC).
h) **Coordinated support to regional and sub-regional organisations and southern partners**

Collaboration between the UN and EU should go beyond EU support to the UN. It should focus equally on collaboration in the provision of support and capacity building to regional (e.g. AU) and sub-regional organisations and southern partners.

**Actions**

### A - Clearing House and bundling MS Contributions

*Actions under Field A are to support the EU’s and UN’s capability-driven approach. This approach includes both military and civilian capabilities required to accomplish assigned tasks, and encompasses human resources, equipment, planning / conduct, training and mission support. EU support could take the form of assisting in meeting UN capability gaps by “bundling” Member States’ contributions.*

1.A. **Define a list of military capabilities the EU Member States can potentially put at UN disposal**

Engage, on the basis of the UN gap list, in a dialogue with the UN with a view to identifying in more details area/domains where the UN has a capability gap and where future capability shortfalls may occur. Also clarify procedural aspects, in particular financial ones, linked to this action.

Analyze the military requirements expressed by the UN and translate them into commonly used reference capabilities. Take the EU military capability development process into account as appropriate. Identify procedures for providing those capabilities as an EU-coordinated component. In particular, the EUMC would have a central role in this. Procedural aspects - in particular financial ones - will have to be discussed by competent working bodies (i.e. EUMC/PMG).

Above list should be intended to provide indications only. The ultimate decision on making capabilities available must stay with owner Member States.
DPKO/ DFS have already identified persistent systemic capability gaps, such as air mobility, engineering units, information collection and analysis and communications. UN understands that the EU is not in a position to commit its Member States. However, it considers that EU support can only be effective if it goes beyond the level of readiness reflected in the United Nations Standby Arrangements System.  

2.A. **Define a list of civilian capabilities the EU Member States can potentially put at UN disposal**

While involving the UN in the process, and subject to the Goalkeeper software becoming operational, translate EU civilian capabilities in the EU virtual repository into corresponding civilian capabilities required by the UN, keeping EU identified needs as a priority. This would facilitate possible EU contributions whenever UN requests EU support to specific UN missions and operations. It should add value to both organizations, and optimize Member States's management of their scarce civilian resources (also considering that recent EU and UN operations and missions have had similar difficulties in generating certain capabilities (e.g. Rule-of-Law, certain categories of Police, Prison System, Mission Support).

DPKO/ DFS have already identified persistent systemic capability gaps, such as mine action, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), and/or ammunition management expertise. In-kind expertise could be made available for UN Headquarters as well as field programmes where the UN is managing mine action coordination centres and is involved in providing advisory capacity to national authorities.

CRT and SSR pools of experts could be made available to UN. That would allow the EU to support UN with the temporary deployment of experts, provided that all applicable conditions are respected, including Member States' final decision on the deployment of the experts and PSC approval. The CRT and SSR concepts should be reviewed to take into account the possible deployment of experts in support to UN and to ensure the shortest processing and approval process possible.

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2 http://www.un.org/chinese/work/peace/rapid/sys.htm
When using EU-managed capabilities, a clear EU priority should be indicated as a caveat as a return on the investment the EU has made in selecting and training personnel.

3.A. Create a concept on EU facilitating coordinated MS contributions to UN operations (Clearing House Model)

In acting as Clearing House, the EU could coordinate contributions from different Member States to UN peacekeeping, e.g. by “pairing” or “bundling” capabilities in order to establish the capability necessary to the UN. This could help Member States optimize the use of scarce and expensive capabilities and promote burden sharing. DPKO/DFS have strong interest in this type of assistance. This should represent an added value for Member States and both organisations. Potential differences in the coordination of military and civilian capacities should be analysed. No new permanent mechanisms should be created.

In close consultation with the UN, EU could create a concept for this, identifying areas where Member States' deployment in UN operations could usefully be coordinated, seeking to alleviate some of the constraints that prevent Member States from making their capabilities available to the UN.

The Clearing House function would be greatly enhanced if the EU and the UN can work towards harmonizing pre-deployment standards. The EU should be invited to provide input and views on the revised guidance for UN Selection Assistance Teams (SAT) and UN Special Police Assessment Team (SPAT) for pre-deployment testing of individual police officers and Formed Police Units. The EU and UN can work together to assist other Police Contributing Countries (PCC) with pre-SAT and pre-deployment training for EU and UN police deployment and to develop national capacities of the individual PCCs.
B. EU providing an EU component to a UN operation (Modular Approach)

B.1. Create a Concept on EU providing a component to a UN operation (Modular Approach)

Example of the EU following a Modular Approach in supporting an international organisation was the EU support to AMIS, the African Union's mission to Darfur.

This approach would envisage the EU agreeing to set up a force and to deploy it under a UN flag as a EU contribution to the UN.

In close consultation with the UN, EU could create a concept for this, considering:

- How to preserve EU autonomy of decision making while placing an EU force under UN command;
- Whether the EU, considering all relevant legal and institutional issues, could apply UN doctrine and concepts to an EU force placed under UN command (preservation of EU ownership of the chain of command whilst ensuring compatibility between EU and UN concepts).
- The existing EU Concept on EU Supporting Actions (doc. 16274/08), which was designed for "the EU to achieve its objectives to improve the situation in an area of crisis through the strengthening of an operation/ mission led by another international actor";
- Lessons learned from the EU support to AMIS (the AU mission to Darfur).

On the military side, DPKO/ DFS would welcome a dialogue with EUMS to define nature, size and modalities for a possible future military component to be generated and deployed by the EU.

On the civilian side, DPKO/ DFS would like to explore the possibility of subcontracting to the EU specific tasks for an UN operation, e.g. in engineering, establishing hospitals or the provisions of “niche” capabilities such as SSR, DDR, rule of law, border management etc.
C - EU autonomous civilian deployment in support of UN

C.1. Create a concept on EU autonomous civilian deployment in support of UN operations

Examples of this kind of deployment include EUPOL and EUSEC RD Congo, which perform complementary activities on police reform and SSR and work closely with MONUSCO in these areas. Further examples are the EUPM's taking over the UN role in Bi-H, and EULEX Kosovo's assuming functions initially covered by UNMIK.

An example of possible future EU civilian deployment in support of UN could be found in Haiti, where there is a need for niche capabilities to help develop the national police institutions – such as human resources experts to assist in the establishment of a Haiti national police human resources system.

A concept on EU autonomous civilian deployment in support of UN operations should cover all aspects related to the planning of this kind of operation, including strategic direction and political control, operational issues, chain of command, human resources, logistics, financial aspects, security, intelligence and others as necessary.

This concept should draw on lessons from previous experiences, with particular reference to EULEX Kosovo (as recommended by PMG). In close consultation with the UN and taking account of lessons learned from past missions (see examples above), operational scenarios could be identified where the EU might autonomously deploy its civilian capabilities in support of a UN operation.

a) Co-deployment - EU autonomous civilian deployment in parallel to a UN operation

Examples of this kind of deployment are numerous (see e.g. those above). These should be drawn upon when drawing up a concept on EU autonomous civilian deployment in support of UN operations.
b) **Takeover - EU civilian missions taking over from a UN operation**

Drawing lessons from past experiences as well as taking into account new structures and processes at both EU and UN side, the concept could support smooth handover, e.g. by giving rise to appropriate Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for handover in theatre.

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**D - EU autonomous military deployment in support of UN**

**D.1. Create a concept on EU autonomous military deployment in support of UN operations**

*Examples of this kind of deployment include Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), successful in stabilising the situation in Bunia and enforcing the UN presence in DRC, EUFOR RD Congo, providing security to the UN Mission in DRC (MONUC) during general elections, EUFOR Tchad/ RCA, bridging the start-up phase of the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT).*

A concept on EU autonomous military deployment in support of UN operations should cover all aspects related to the planning of this kind of operation, including strategic direction and political control, operational issues, chain of command, personnel, logistics, financial aspects, security, intelligence and others as necessary.

Lessons from past experiences indicate that clear arrangements are needed on the use of UN resources by EU and vice versa to prevent problems. The concept should therefore envisage Technical Arrangements or other forms of legally binding instruments between EU and UN to set clear conditions as regards e.g. the reciprocal use of capabilities, including modalities for dispute settlement between the two organisations.

This concept should draw on lessons from previous experiences (see examples above). In close consultation with the UN and taking account of lessons learned from past missions, operational scenarios could be identified where the EU might autonomously deploy its military capabilities in support of a UN operation.³

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³ In the case of bridging deployments, these operational scenarios could be, e.g., to a) secure port of embarkation for a UN
In such a concept, the following types of deployment could be envisaged:

**a) Bridging - EU autonomous military deployment ahead of a UN operation.**

An example of this type of deployment is EUFOR Tchad/RCA.

EU could envisage to use Battlegroups and other assets for this kind of operation.

DPKO/ DFS remains interested in drawing on EU Battlegroups. They note that UN peacekeeping experience had shown that gaps in terms of numbers (where mandates had been adjusted to increase the size of the force) were similar to the prescribed size of the EU Battlegroup.

**b) Co-deployment - EU autonomous military deployment in parallel to a UN operation**

Examples of this type of deployment are Artemis in DRC and EUFOR RD Congo.

Through a rapid-reaction force deployed in parallel with a given UN operation, the EU could support the UN operation in case it encounters difficulties. This kind of deployment often concerns an ‘over-the-horizon reserve’ or a ‘protection force’ provided by the EU in support of a UN operation. An example of this kind of operation is EUFOR RD Congo, which included a rapidly deployable over-the-horizon force stationed in Gabon.\(^4\)

DPKO/ DFS remains interested in drawing on EU Battlegroups, and has indicated that, in their contingency planning for the UN Mission in Sudan, they had envisaged the possible deployment of an EU Battlegroup as a reserve force.

**c) Takeover - EU autonomous military deployment taking over a UN operation.**

Ongoing work at UN side on transitions is to be taken into account.

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\(^4\) Other examples involving EU Member States deploying in this manner, although not under EU flag, are the forces deployed by the United Kingdom in the territorial waters of Sierra Leone following their military intervention in that country in 2000, or the French-led Operation Licorne in Ivory Coast, deployed simultaneously with the UNOCI.
E - Assistance to AU and other regional and sub-regional organisations

E.1. Define a joint EU-UN coordination mechanism on assistance to AU and other regional organizations

The EU and UN could set up a mechanism to coordinate their respective assistance to AU and other regional and sub-regional actors through:

- Enhanced coordination and information-sharing at operational/technical level in Addis Ababa between the EU Delegation to the AU and the UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU);

- A yearly coordination meeting of EU and UN with the AU Peace and Security Department to discuss benchmarks, goals, needs and timelines for operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture and possible adjustment of strategies as necessary;

- Possible synergies between the African Peace Facility capacity-building program and the technical assistance and training implemented by UNOAU for the African Standby Force (ASF) and within the larger African Peace Support Architecture (APSA); EU and UN support to the AU for ASF should take into account the results of the Amani Africa cycle;\(^5\)

- Cooperation between EU, UN and AU, building on the EU-AU 2010 assessment of the APSA readiness, with an eye to identifying the support required to make the African Standby Force operational;

- Continued EU assistance to AU in the preparation of African forces for deployment on UNPKO.

\(^5\) According to the UN, EU-UN cooperation should be enhanced in supporting the civilian and police components of the ASF. Furthermore, to complement the UN’s assistance in peacekeeping policy doctrine and planning, UN suggests that the EU could, for example, consider providing training and capacity building in the areas of financial management, human resource management, procurement and administration to the AU.
F - Cross-cutting areas

F.1. Provide support to the UN Civilian Capacity Initiative.

Actions to provide support to the UN Civilian Capacity Initiative could include the following:

- Provide support to the UN in identifying practical ways of matching demand with supply in critical civilian capability areas, to expedite recruitment and avoid overlapping when deploying civilian CSDP capabilities in support of UN.

- In so doing, make use of experience and results obtained by the EU in the field of civilian capability development for CSDP.

In particular, experience should be shared in the areas of:

- Shared methodologies to establish:
  - Needs for civilian crisis management in specialist civilian capacity areas, such as police, justice, SSR and public administration;
  - Potential availability of national civilian capabilities;
  - Shortfalls;
  - Shared guidance on capability development;

- Strategies and tools to facilitate the raising of civilian personnel.

Such EU-UN cooperation, building on experiences obtained with Civilian Headline Goal (CHG) 2008 and CHG 2010 (already largely based on UN experiences, notably in Kosovo and Timor Leste) as well as the body of operational experience of both organizations and the emerging lessons from Libya, South Sudan and Afghanistan, could help galvanize coordination in civilian specialist areas.

DPKO/ DFS draw attention to a number of areas where EU experience in civilian capability development for crisis management could be of direct support to UN field operations:
The EU could consider providing civilian expertise to UN operations in specialist niche areas beyond those that have been explored to date (i.e. police, justice, SSR): e.g. border and customs management, public administration at national and local level. The EU could also consider engaging with the UN (through relevant UN focal points) on the development of possible standards, guidance and training in above areas.

The EU could also assist in UN outreach to potential non-government providers, e.g. training institutes and centres of excellence.

The EU could consider entering into standing arrangements with the UN to enable regular exchange on capabilities and resources (including rosters), best practices and lessons learned. The EU could also consider making arrangements allowing the UN to request and draw on civilian EU capabilities, without prejudice to decision making by either the EU or the EU Member States. For this purpose, the Goalkeeper software environment (currently under development by EU) could become instrumental as information hub.6

The EU has developed groups of personnel – CRTs – for deployment in post-conflict contexts. The UN and EU could explore options for the deployment of CRTs within a UN operation in cases where rapidly deployable capacities are required.

The EU could consider participation in the forthcoming online platform CapMatch that aims to facilitate information and exchange between field demands and potential providers of expertise.

F.2. Establish technical arrangements with DPKO/ DFS on cooperation in Capability Development

Technical arrangements could be established between EU and UN to facilitate:

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6 The UN Civilian Capacity Initiative is exploring options for the establishment of standing arrangements – formal or informal - between the UN and potential provider partners to enable regular exchange on capabilities and resources (including rosters), joint knowledge and lesson learned, and potential arrangements for the UN to request and draw on civilian expert capacities.
– Recruitment and selection; this may entail a harmonization of standard operating procedures and deployment methods; also, rosters and job descriptions should be compatible for instance with respect to classification of skill sets, structure, etc.

– Sharing the acquis that EU gained from translating lists of required civilian CSDP capabilities into Standard Job Descriptions for prospective civilian crisis management personnel, which allow the EU to liaise more efficiently with the providers of such personnel; liaising with relevant parts of DPKO to ensure compatibility with standardised UN job descriptions, where they exist.

– Sharing with the UN the insight on how EU Member States raise personnel for civilian crisis management that was gained through CHG 2008, CHG 2010 and the EU’s yearly reports on Member States' progress in facilitating deployment of civilian personnel for CSDP. In this context, the EU could consider inviting the UN to relevant seminars or conferences on capability issues.

– Making the Goalkeeper software environment (EU tools designed to help Member States in raising civilian personnel for CSDP) available to Member States also to support raising personnel for UN purposes. Member States would have the advantage of maintaining one roster to cater for either EU or UN needs. Rosters will stay under national control, with no access possibility by the UN.

F.3. Establish technical arrangements with DPKO/DFS on mutual support in developing doctrine and concepts in the area of crisis management

Technical Arrangements could be established between EU and UN to facilitate:

– **Rapid deployment of military and civilian capacities.** Exchange of experience, participation in respective rapid response exercises, and incorporating lessons learned can improve concepts and operational capacity of both organisations.\(^7\) EU and UN could exchange experience and lessons learned in Military Rapid Response in order to improve concepts and operational capacity of both organisations in that area. Commonality between concepts and doctrine in that area of both organizations is to be explored in order to promote interoperability.

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\(^7\) Both the EU and the UN have in recent years put significant effort into developing concepts for rapid deployment of civilian and military capacities, having established respectively the CRT pool and the UN Standing Police Capacity and Judicial and Corrections Standing Capacity (SPC) and UN Justice and Corrections Standing Capacity (JCSC) both based in Brindisi, Italy, in addition to the Standing Mine Action Capacity (civilian) in support of Rapid Reaction Framework.
- **UN Strategic Doctrinal Framework for International Police Peacekeeping.** The EU is already supporting DPKO/ DFS in developing a UN Strategic Doctrinal Framework for International Police Peacekeeping.  

8

- **Mutual access to respective concepts.** Establish arrangements to access each other's concepts library;

- **Indicators relevant to specific Rule of Law sectors.** UN already has Rule of Law (RoL) Indicators that have been developed over a number of years. Those indicators have been jointly adopted by DPKO and OHCHR this year and have been piloted in Liberia and Haiti. The EU-UN technical arrangements, rather than developing new EU indicators, should envisage the possibility for the EU to use UN indicators, also not to risk duplication with the UN Rule of Law Indicators Project. Joint EU-DPKO work on indicators relevant to specific RoL sectors (e.g. border management) has been proposed in the Way Ahead of the CPCC guidelines on benchmarking.

Consistency on RoL indicators would also be a useful foundation on which to begin discussing benchmarks to measure the impact of assistance in RoL areas, which can either be developed jointly or should at least be compatible.

- **EU FPU contributions to UN police peacekeeping operations.** Consistency and effectiveness of such contributions can be enhanced by applying the UN policy on FPU in UN peacekeeping operations.  

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- **Reinforcing police authorities in host countries.** While cooperating with UN on concept and police doctrine development, EU could give priority to concepts for reinforcing local police authorities in host countries, such as for example Intelligence-Led Policing.

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8 The concept covers aspects such as provision of public safety, police reform and support to host state police services in post conflict environments, in view of coordinating efforts. The UN Strategic Doctrinal Framework is intended to respond to an increasing demand for UN police peace-keeping operations and to develop global standards suitable for policing and police reform efforts in peace keeping context.

9 The EEAS took active part in the UN DPKO Doctrine Development Group for Formed Police Units (FPU). Following the work of this Group, DPKO/ DFS revised the UN policy on FPU in UN peacekeeping operations, which was approved on 1 March 2010. That document represents a sound doctrine aiming at enhancing the reliability of any FPU contributing to UN police peace-keeping operations. Being in line with both EU and UN doctrine for FPU, it facilitates mutual interoperability of FPU at different levels.
F.4. Establish technical arrangements with DPKO/DFS on cooperation in training and exercises

Technical Arrangements could be established between EU and UN to facilitate:

- **Development and delivery of training.** Training courses should promote compliance with international treaties and conventions as well as with relevant international technical standards. Training courses delivered in the EU should be more broadly accessible to UN participants and EU-UN synergies in training activities should be enhanced. Consideration could also be given to comparing the UN and EU approaches towards defining minimum training standards, to pooling training resources and to establishing joint certification modalities. EU could invite UN to deliver UN-related modules within EU training on security sector reform, including those aimed at the members of the EU SSR roster;

- **Opening Goalkeeper-Schoolmaster to the UN.** That would allow the EU and UN to share training opportunities on a more predictable and systematic basis. Both EU and UN would benefit from training courses of mutual interest. Admission of participants to courses advertised in Schoolmaster would always remain at the discretion of course-providing training institutions.

- **Minimum training standards for FPU.** EU could continue cooperation with UN on development of minimum training standards for FPU.

- **Common pre-deployment training standards for EU and UN police.** EU could continue cooperation with UN on development of common pre-deployment training standards for EU and UN police.

- **Training modules and mentorship to Police Contributing Countries.** EU could further contribute to the development and provision of training modules and mentorship to Police Contributing Countries, taking account of the pre-deployment training support methods to police officers from developing countries that were initiated and piloted by DPKO (Police Division) in light of the UNAMID mission;
Participation in exercises at the level of observer and player. EU and UN participation in each other's exercises should take place on mutual basis. In line with the EU Comprehensive Approach, all EU actors should be involved as appropriate (Political, Strategic and Operational). The Technical Agreement should 1) Identify the appropriate EU and UN participants while defining their roles (observer or player); and 2) Envisage participation in each other's exercises also at planner level.

F.5. Establish technical arrangements with DPKO/ DFS on cooperation in the area of Lessons Learned

EU and UN could exchange information on their respective Lessons Learned architectures. UN experience can contribute to more harmonized EU lessons-learned structures and approaches, especially now that the EU is building its own lessons-learned architecture. In particular, the EU may draw on relevant UN lessons and impact evaluations conducted through a broad-based consultation with stakeholders, including in the framework of the UN Peace-Building Commission. This exchange has already been partially established (EUMS/Log access to UN Peacekeeping Resource Hub). DPKO's Policy, Evaluation and Training Division is keen to exchange lessons learned with EU.

F.6. Develop a General Framework between UN and EU on operational aspects of cooperation in peacekeeping/ crisis management, in particular the modular approach

Such General Framework would encompass all operational aspects of cooperation, including logistic and support ones, in particular in relation to the modular approach.

In would comprise, and not be limited to, decisions relating to participation in operations and missions, status of personnel and units, participating modalities in operations, chain of command, financial aspects, and implementing arrangements.

This complex endeavour is expected to encompass most actions described above and require a substantial amount of time.